Early Colonial History

Four of Seven

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Windfalls in Micronesia: Carolinians' environmental history in the Marianas

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Abstract: *Wind and weather are an ever present agent in Pacific population dynamics and were major factors contributing to pre-historic settlement movements. Typhoons have blown sailing canoes off-course, and the devastation of storm-hit islands has forced communities to seek refuge elsewhere. Clan genealogies give oral evidence of such movements. Although an inherent aspect of island life, they have hardly been analyzed in the region's environmental history. While in pre-colonial times, established inter-island relations efficiently served as a form of disaster relief with mutual help and assistance, closer details of Spanish and German colonial records suggest that later on, such population movements were administered and had rather political and/or economic reasons. This case study will cast a critical look on the history of Carolinians on Saipan as it is commonly told, outlining cultural, economic and political details behind this inter-island relationship, starting in pre-colonial times all the way to today.*

The blue hole in environmental history

In the past decades, the rhetoric in regard to Pacific islands has shifted its baseline conception from places of paradisaical life to vulnerable patches of sand, threatened by rising sea-levels, torn by storms and the source of future 'climate refugees'. Following the trend, my research interest lies in perceptions of climate change in relation to present-day and future adaptation strategies, with special regard to disaster behavior and population movement. Why, then, is an anthropologist with such a focus interested in studying the past? Of course, history allows us to deduct notions of contemporary behavioral structures and patterns, but isn't it commonly agreed upon that climate change challenges humanity in an unprecedented way? The islands, once praised as 'sites of resilience' (Campbell 2009) where '[h]azard then is implicit in a population's normal relationship with its environment' (Jeffery 1981: no page) turned into vulnerable hotspots with Western media having taken a liking to represent the inhabitants as victims of our notorious, high emission lifestyle. By now, most island governments have realized the economic and political potential of playing out the climate change impact card

while at the same time, many rural dwellers (at least in Chuuk, where I conduct my research) have no concept of what global warming implies or simply do not acknowledge it as an immediate threat in spite of their daily observations. While at first, this seems paradox, the study of the people's environmental history, their acculturated perceptions and accumulated experiences of natural forces which are intrinsically linked to contemporary ideologies, might help to shed light on some of the apparent controversies.

In fact, owing to the natural set-up of the Pacific region, environmental history has been the underlying basis of most ethnographic studies in Oceania. Both waves of settlement and subsequent socio-economic development were much affected from the physical environment where differing sea-levels, prevailing ocean currents, soil compositions, wind patterns and typhoons played a prominent role. Nevertheless, mainstream historical research has, more often than not, neglected the 'chickpeas' at the 'edge of the world'. Mostly, 'history [is] understood to begin and end on land' (Gillis 2011: 16), ignoring the fact that in Oceania, the opposite comes much closer to reality and that ancient European metaphors such as land equals civilization while the sea symbolizes the barbaric certainly fail to adequately describe the sea-faring cultures with their sophisticated navigational skills, their dependency on the ocean for food, material, as well as the establishment for systems of trade and tribute, warfare and disaster relief. Yet, since environmental history bridges natural and social sciences, a concoction which has become central to current research on climate change impacts, Oceanic environmental history should certainly receive new attention. It should use its theoretical potential to deconstruct Western concepts of land-water borders, allowing for new concepts such as John Gillis' (2011) *ecotones* (the overlap of two ecosystems), a term that complies much better with local perceptions of 'land'. For the time being, however, he metaphorically denotes the world's oceans as a 'blue whole in environmental history', a discipline that 'remains (...) remarkably landlocked' (ibid 2011: 16).

In an attempt to start filling this blue hole, we will now concentrate on two dramatic intersections between nature and society in Micronesia's hydrography (in its broadest sense), disasters and environmental migration, which are commonly assumed to have been the driver of Carolinian presence in the Marianas since the 18th century. However, while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees points out that a categorization of displaced people is, due to combined impacts of the environment, economic pressures and conflict, *increasingly* difficult, I argue that conflicting environmental and economic dependencies are rather the rule than the

exception and that any disaster-migration in the past should be analyzed accordingly. Namely in subsistence based societies, nature and economy are indisputably linked with each other and disruptions to the environment have fatal consequences on local economic output. Unfortunately, current hype on climate refugees has the tendency to over stress the physical factor, in many cases ignoring the long established external elements of the local food and material culture which date back to the first contacts with European beachcombers, whalers and traders. Thus, to have a thorough look at historic cases might help to delineate the developing and/or changing circumstances that play a role in nowadays and future climate-related population movements.

Disaster migration in Micronesia?

When looking at the case of Carolinians in the Marianas, one of the questions that immediately spring up is why instances of disaster-induced migration are seemingly concentrated in the 18th, 19th and 20th century? Is it pure coincidence that they align with the emergence of European colonial powers? The circumstances of the relocations in the early 20th century are fairly well documented and analyzed accordingly (i.e. Spennemann 1999), while the arrival of people from the 'southern islands' throughout the 18th and 19th centuries are generally taken to be refugees who asked for asylum after typhoons had ravaged their home islands. Yet, the sources indicate that other conclusions might be possible as well and that we should at least refrain from making quick generalizations. Concerning pre-contact times of which no written and only few archaeological or other physical evidence is at hand, historians have to rely on oral traditions. In Micronesia's sea-faring culture, caprioles of weather found an eminent spot in the collective memory and in spite of the great navigational skills, the safe return of a sailing party could never be taken for granted. How many canoes in pre-historic times capsized or were blown off-course during wind gales, we cannot know, but the prolonged efforts by German colonial authorities to discontinue sea-voyages in traditional canoes, not least because of the expenses involved in repatriating the cast-aways, give us a vague idea.

On land, strong winds, heavy rains, salt-spray and storm surges were and continue to pose a great threat to islands with restricted land resources and lack of alternatives. If, however, typhoons regularly initiated long-term resettlement remains to be proven and can at least be challenged on the grounds of an anthropological approach to Micronesian culture and history, backed up by a re-evaluation of the written record and literature. This, however, does not completely

dispute the possibility of disaster-induced population movement in Micronesia as such, but it adheres to the fact that most reports of so-called disaster-related migrations do not give sufficient or plausible evidence for migrational decisions made by the people themselves, at least not as a collective unit1. The two facets of regional history and cultural behavior that let me seriously doubt the idea of first-hand typhoon-induced movements will be alluded to in the following.

Micronesian spatiality

First, an important trait of Micronesian culture is the intrinsic bond that people have to their land and ancestors. They genuinely build (although more so in the past as in the present) their personhood around their extended kin and clan members whose collective identities are rooted in their land. It is therefore easy to see how, as reported by Cantova, the worst punishment for wrong-doers was exile (cited in Lévesque 1998: 469). Lineage and family land were highly regarded as economic, social and historic property and to capture additional land was the motivation of much warfare. Nevertheless, most individual islands were also integrated in inter-island systems of trade and tribute. In regions of real and presumed threat from nature such ties can also serve as a strategy of disaster relief, because usually, the various islands of one area show differing degrees of destruction. Hence, temporary supply lines of food and seedlings that enabled quick recovery and in theory even sanctuary were never too far. But the emphasis clearly lies on short-term mitigation. Large-scale permanent resettlement can simply be no first-hand option in a world where virtually all land is in ownership, where land is equivalent to food and shelter as much as to cultural identity, an identity that is collective and very much encircled by close kin-relations.

Whereas the hardship that people suffer when their islands are completely flattened, when not a single house or tree remains standing, is not to be disputed, serious post-disaster food crisis, apart from a few exceptions, do not seem to have been a frequent occurrence in pre-colonial times. Many informants come up with a whole list of plants that shoot up right after disaster strikes. They also talk about unusually tame fish that come much closer to the shore. Yet most important, people collectively deny that their forefathers would ever have left their islands, not even temporarily. To them, such a suggestion sounds almost insulting, saying they are weak and that they do not know how to survive in their own environment! Nevertheless, individual families might have faced differing degrees of hardship, depending on the size, quality and location of their land property and thus, single units might have seen some advantage in emigrating.

Later, however, food has indeed had a major impact on post-disaster mitigation and structural population shifts. These, however, have to be seen in the light of administered disaster relief, starting with European colonization. Fritz, the first German colonial administrator, for example, saw typhoons both as a curse and blessing as increasing need (after a whole series of typhoons in the early 1900s) of store-food 'paved the way for the development of a cash economy' (Spennemann 1999: 172, 173). This development found its climax under U.S. Navy rule, where disaster-help has not always been a blessing, but deeply changed the people's reliance on store-food with major consequences for both culture and health as is described elsewhere (i.e. Alkire, n.y., Lessa, 1968 and Marshall, 1979). Again, it just seems very unlikely that islanders ever easily left behind their relative secure livelihoods and kinship circles. Furthermore, it seems at least odd that people would flee their disaster-stricken islands and seek refuge in the Marianas, which themselves lie in the typhoon path, are shaken by earthquakes and partly even show active volcanism, making them certainly not the smartest choice to escape future catastrophes, and such calamities have indeed triggered both hardship and inner-archipelago relocations later on.

The written record also gives us some commentaries that pinpoint the mood of Carolinians in the Marianas: The first non-Chamorro islanders whom the Spanish encountered, the castaways from 1721, wished to return to their home land, in spite of 'obvious material advantages' given to them thanks to Father Cantova's affection (Barratt 1988: 21), 'declaring that they would all most assuredly die (...) because life was bitter and unbearable in the absence of their relatives.' (Ibáñez y García 1992: 168). Then, a hundred yeas later, in the 1820s, Captain Lütke speaks of draining happiness and forced smiles in their faces (Barratt 1988: 29), but maybe the strongest hint towards the involuntary nature of disaster-movement is the reaction to the first master-minded large-scale relocation in the aftermath of the Good Friday typhoon of 1907. The people, so the documents tell us, were very reluctant to move and neither saw the necessity given the Germans' supply of rice (McKinney 1947: 108 and Spennemann 1999).

Thus if we keep in mind that land in Micronesia is commonly, yet privately held for lineages and clans, the fact that the islands north of Rota were empty, have to be seen as an important pre-requisite to Carolinian settlement. Paired with the lure of materialism that already had left some impression on the islanders, we might even be tempted to suggest it was an active decision, driven by economic promises, further supported by the government that officially welcomed them as laborers.

The various groups that followed the initial settlers throughout the year were most probably drawn in by their relatives rather than pushed out by disaster impact. And in the end, many returned home in the subsequent years and it was the government who now struggled to keep them in the archipelago.

Micronesian mobility

This brings us to a second major point that explains the presence of Carolinians that has nothing or only little to do with disaster migration: In pre-European times, trading contact between Caroline and Mariana islanders had been vivid for centuries, although not undisrupted and with varying intensity. To quote Barratt (1988: 15): 'What appeared to the Spaniards a novelty in 1721, when Western Carolineans [sic] returned to Guam, after an absence of a half a century, was in reality the mere resumption of a pattern that had been established long before Magellan's birth.' The Carolinians had only given up their trading trips along the *metawal wool* upon watching the Spanish atrocities and in fact, for a while, population streams were redirected in the opposite direction once ferocities between Spanish soldiers and the Chamorro population reached their height in the latter half of the 17th century. And although the dissimilar wealth of resources on the Marianas compared to the atolls is often seen as one major reason for resettlements in the first place, it was not food that was traded in by the Carolinians, but, valuable goods such as turmeric, medicinal plants and the like.

Therefore, albeit the first contact between Carolinians and Europeans on Guam was owed to wind and weather, their presence was neither unprecedented, nor did it initiate any long-term settlement, the Carolinians having been eager to go home to their families. Rather, to ensure their return in order to establish regular trade and engage in some sort of relation with the outer Spanish jurisdiction, the governor wanted to retain some chiefs on Guam, but gave up the idea after much pleading from the atoll-dwellers (see above). Coming from the other side, the governor was much interested in his share of the trepang trade and was thus eager to employ the Carolinians who moved so easily between the treacherous reefs (ibid.). We know that in addition to that, Spanish officials sought their qualities and barcas as messengers between the islands and their services as agile swimmers and divers, for procuring and transporting meat supplies from Tinian and Rota (Barratt 1988: 25; Chamisso in ibid: 49). Yet, as the Russian captain Lütke observes, there was also another side to it: 'In order to retain the services of these men, less than strictly honorable means are perhaps used those same means to which capitalists have recourse to enslave workers.' (cited in Barratt 1988: 63)

Over the years, the sources note that the seasonal arrival (making use of favoring wind patterns) was a much cherished distraction from the otherwise slow island life. I can only imagine that this was all the more true for the Carolinian communities as the flotillas certainly brought relatives and news from home which were probably just as valuable to them as merchandise. Over the time, some more enterprising Carolinians began to take orders for the following year, deepening the trading bond, while others found more and more business incentives which eventually made them sedentary in the Marianas (Barratt 1988: 28). The governor calculated his own profit and eventually succeeded in gaining a settlement permit from the Philippines, of which the Marianas were a district at that time, and Saipan was opened to Carolinians in 1819 on the condition that they embrace Christianity and that they regularly procure dried meat from Tinian and bring it down to Guam (Barratt 1988: 28).

The late 1840s (Rogers 2011: 94) saw a whole series of catastrophes caused by typhoons and tsunamis and brought Carolinians in several stages to the Marianas, where they went to live on Guam and Saipan (Barratt 1988: 30). However, much of this might be owing to the fact that they did have relatives there, which, paired with the economic prospect, made them turn to the Marianas instead of relying on traditional mitigation strategies such as discussed above. Whereas taro and coconut might take up to one or two years to recover, the economic pull factors in the 1850s and 60s were supposedly still the stronger argument, once again supported by the official side's settlement schemes, i.e. to back up the agricultural industry for which a whole array of measures have been implemented to support 'voluntary' migration from the Carolinians to the Marianas. The Carolinian workers, however, saw such arrangements always as being of temporary character.

Carolinian movement did also seldom end once they reached the islands to their North. They were rather shifted around a fair bit within the archipelago as well, often under the pretense of stress from natural calamities, to lighten the already existing food burden (Propst 2011: 279) or simply due to the 'suitability of moving (to Saipan) the Carolinians' of Guam and Rota 'inasmuch as Saipan is almost completely uninhabited and has an abundance of fertile lands that are presently uncultivated.' Historic documents tell us furthermore that such movement was 'not *completely* voluntary' (PNA, Marianas, Bundle 20, Doc. 9. Exp. 95, ff. 1-15a, 1885 as cited in Driver and Brunal-Perry 1996: 25, 28; own italics) and it therefore was suggested to pay the expenses of the move and to exempt them from compulsory services. Finally, in 1901, the meanwhile American authorities of Guam sent all

remaining Carolinian people to the German Marianas. Further movements followed, but will not be outlined here. In sum, can we really see Carolinian population movements during the colonial rule dispatched from European impact, igniting new aspirations on the islanders' side and calculated measurements on the European side?

German disaster rationale

Once the Germans resumed power, we can clearly speak of politically and especially economically motivated resettlement schemes and drop the term disaster-migration entirely. Dirk Spennemann (1999: 176) writes: 'The German administration, intent on the agricultural and economic development of the area, was more concerned about their effects than the people affected.' He goes on that soon after the Germans took over, the idea to 'import' people from the 'overpopulated' Carolinians sprang up who could be used as paid labour in the copra plantations (ibid: 177). In 1905, ideas became reality and a small group from Pingelap, hit by a typhoon, reached the Marianas to work for the Pagan Society. As Spennemann (Spennemann 1999: 177, own italics) plainly puts it: 'The arrival of this group opened up ideas for larger movements, *should the opportunity arise*.' And so it did in 1907 when a severe typhoon badly affected the whole region south of Guam, culminating in the atoll islanders resettlement scheme of 1907 and 1908. This case clearly illustrates the full rational of so-called disaster-migration during German colonial times, representing the best written account of colonial proceedings.

Thus, coated as humanitarian aid, the 'evacuation' of some islanders resembles more to forced relocation. The full scope of this rationale becomes clear in the official policy on population movement, according to which the transfer of people from smaller islands to larger, less densely populated ones in order to avoid food shortages was part of the disaster-preparedness strategy, while simultaneously making administration more feasible and stabilizing fertility rates through 'increased intermixing'. Last but not least, the empty land could then be leased to entrepreneurs who set up copra plantations (McKinney 1947: 107). One of the results from this administered shifting of population was that some did settle in their new location in the end, their descendants, however, often enough went back to their parent's islands, thus representing a form of retarded temporary dislocation.

Disaster migration or planned relocation?

As we have seen, to outline the full scope of reasons and circumstances of any population shifts before the German account is difficult, respectively needs further analysis and a re-evaluation of the written evidence that exists as well as the inclusion of local oral history. However, judging from traditional disaster behavior, it seems unlikely that permanent relocation was the endeavor of these groups. Thus, every case of so-called disaster-migration requests a careful consideration of the details, the circumstances and the written sources that are often not explicit. Cases should be individually judged upon reading and putting together the bits and pieces, analyzing them against historical background and comprehending them within local cultural patterns.

Filling the blue hole

To conclude and wind back to our considerations of a regional environmental history in the beginning, it should be remembered once more that the theme of mobility and weather are inseparable from any description of Micronesian life, in the past as much as in the present and due to recent climate change scenarios also, or even more in the future. While for pre-colonial island communities, there probably never has been much of a question of separating the human from nature, the introduction of European commodities, lifestyles and evangelization set in motion a process of cultural alteration that is still going today. Thus, whereas islanders had long adapted to their not always so friendly environments, basic structural changes were initiated both from within the indigenous societies as well as from outside once European presence in the islands was fortified. In the end, I daresay that in the past as much as currently and probably also in the very near future (maybe not, however, much beyond that), pull factors overrule push factors in migrational decisions in Micronesia. However, one of the most extreme consequences of climate change is represented in people who loose their *home* due to environmental tensions. And although Micronesians have represented themselves as a flexible and creative people, adaptation capacities have their limits and individual migration decisions as well as collective relocations due to overwhelming environmental stress are likely and should therefore find entrance in regional as much as global policy making. And here, environmental histories, overcoming borders of time and space, offer an adapt approach to the topic, especially as they, according to David Blackbourn (2011), ask for a new *sense of place*, something that has become a highly valued identity marker in current climate change debate. Thus, with environmental history allowing for 'histories with an open ending' (Uekötter: 3), we are urged to view, review and correlate cases

of climate-related migrations in terms of emic views on spatiality and mobility of the people concerned. In the past as much as in the present.

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"Casa Real": A Lost Church On Guam*

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*This paper is an excerpt from an article in the process of being submitted to the journal Philippine Quarterly to be published by the University of San Carlos, Cebu, Republic of the Philippines.

Abstract: *In the late 17th century A.D, the Jesuits reported building a church in Ritidian. On the present day beach of Ritidian, however, there is no evidence of any Spanish structure ever having stood. Between the ambiguous documentation and the secrecy of the U.S. military when they controlled the area, it is difficult to know the truth. Through archaeological investigation, the subsurface remnants of a stone structure were exposed. An analysis of both primary and secondary texts confirmed that this structure, dubbed "Casa Real" by early 20th century archaeologist, is likely to be the 17th C. church. A church both built and burnt as a mark of Chamorro and Spanish interaction. The importance of this research is not just in locating a lost church, but a story about a tenuous Contact Period in the Marianas.*

Introduction

Since the discovery of Guam by Magellan in 1521, the Spaniards' only use for the island was as a stopover to replenish their supply of food and water (Hezel 2000). Other religious figures, like Fray Juan Pobre of the Franciscans, tried unsuccessfully to garner support to convert the islands (Driver 1993). Sanvitores and the Jesuits, fearing for the souls of the "barbarians" in the Mariana Islands, won the support from the Queen of Spain to bring salvation to the natives (Coomans 2000; Velarde 1987).

It was through the Jesuits that Guam was colonized. According to Garcia (2004) writing about the life of San Vitores, the early Jesuits zealously went about their mission, spreading themselves out thinly among the islands and baptizing as many people as possible. According to Coomans (2000), the last Jesuit martyr in the Mariana Islands, their efforts met with both acceptance and violent objection.

The conflicting historical documentation, dearth of physical evidence, and perhaps the secrecy of the US military has led to some doubt whether a church or mission house ever existed in Ritidian. Due to these uncertainties, an archaeological approach was needed to verify the reality of the mission house.

The purpose of this study was to relocate Casa Real through archaeological questions. It was also a case study of verifying ambiguous historical records through archaeological field research. The culmination of the documentary analysis and archaeological data provided insight into the Spanish-Chamorro relations during the ephemeral Contact period on Guam.

Review of Literature

The majority of the literature on Ritidian is from letters written by the Jesuits and Governors stationed in Guam at the time, as well as the Jesuits' Annual Reports for each of the relevant years.

The limitations of these sources need to be recognized. The Jesuits needed funding for their missions on the islands; therefore they wrote their letters in such a way to encourage support. Their accounts hyped the success of both their evangelism and martyrdom. The evangelism might warrant them money, while the martyrdom would more likely encourage idealistic volunteers to join the mission to the Marianas. The governors, in the interest of recognition and salary, needed to trumpet their victorious battles and virtues of their diplomatic administration. The Jesuits, more than the governor, interacted with the Chamorros and surely wrote a lot of their information based on what they were told, not knowing whether the Chamorros were being truthful or serving their own needs.

The map of the Jesuit footprint on Guam drawn in the 17th Century, while impressive for its time, reveals that the Spaniards did not have a clear grasp on the geographic nor social-political boundaries of the island and the native people (See Figure 1). Ritidian and Inapsan on the map are not in the present day Ritidian and Inapsan.



Urac, Isle deserte
Maug ou Tunas
Assomsong ou Assomption
Agrigan
Pagon
Amalagan
Guguan
Sarigan
Anatajan
Saypan
Tinian
Aguiguan
Zarpane ou Rota
Guahan
GUAHAN
Agadna
Umatag

Figure 1

An analysis of the primary documents reveal that a church dedicated to St. Francis Xavier is built in Ritidian (Garcia 2004). If the reports are to be believed, Sunday mass at the 15ft x 39ft structure found at Ritidian was attended by 400 of the native faithful back in 1675 (Haynes and Wurch 1993). It was so successful that the expansion included a school and a dormitory for girls (Garcia 2004). All came to an end when the resident priest was murdered and the structures burned by the locals (Garcia 2004).

In the neighboring village of Inapsan in 1681, the church of St. Michael was burnt down the same month it was completed the Jesuits decided to rebuild the church (Bouwens 1681E, Solorzano 1681I, 1682D [in Levesque 1992a]). However, they inadvertently rebuilt the church of Inapsan in Ritidian (Saravia 1682N [in Levesque 1992a]; Strobach 1683G, Saravia 1683M, and Angelis 1682I [in Levesque 1992b]).

The resident priest, Fr. Angelis, was murdered during the Chamorro Revolt (Ortiz 1684L and Morales 1688 [in Levesque 1992b]; Rogers 1995). This demonstration of disorder triggered the forced evacuation of the Chamorros from Ritidian to some other town in a policy known as *reduccíon*.



Figure 2

Archaeological records show a ruin first observed by Hornbostel (1924) and later described by Reed (1952). Reed's description of the structure matches Cooman's description of churches built in Guam circa 1682 (See Figure 2). Reed (1952) also took a grainy photograph that shows a masonry ruin, whose size and level of preservation would indicate a Spanish Period building (See Figure 3). What remained of the structure was demolished in 1968 by the U.S. Navy. They commissioned facilities to be built for the Navy Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) for use during the Cold War (Aaron 2010).

Figure 3

The remains of Casa Real may have been bulldozed to accommodate the military structure or use the ruin for its construction materials. In 2009, Peterson excavated ten test pits in an area he suspected to be Casa Real (Carson et al. 2010), based upon georeferencing the maps by Hornbostel (See Figure 4). While no foundation was discovered, the archaeological data, such as the unpublished notes of Hornbostel and the presence of *mampostería*, indicate Casa Real was likely in the vicinity.



Figure 4

Results

There is ample archaeological evidence to suggest that there was a stone structure in Ritidian as recorded by Hornbostel (1924-1925), Osborne (1947), and Reed (1952), and that it was bulldozed after 1958. The GPR (Ground Penetrating Radar) scans and the subsurface testing that followed revealed a possible wall foundation (See Figure 5).

Figure 5

This is further evidenced by the feature and sediment being cut below the ground surface, as would be expected from removing the remnants of the structure with a bulldozer. Also, the GPR scans also show much "noise" radiating from around this area, likely to be the rubble from the structure when it was demolished (See Figure 6).



Figure 6

There certainly was a stone structure in Ritidian, the question is whether it was a church or not. In the literature, the only structure ever reported to have been built in Ritidian prior to the 20th C. is a church, two churches in fact. The mamposteria found on the site provides a ceiling date for the structure since the Spanish introduced this building technique so it did not exist on Guam prior to their arrival in 1521, or more likely their settlement in 1668. The Chamorro revolt and death of Fr. Angelis in 1684 provides a floor date for the structure being used, because all the inhabitants from the north, including Ritidian, were then relocated closer to the capital of Agana after these events.

The structure in Ritidian depicted by Reed as having three windows matches Coomans' description of church architecture on Guam during 1680-1684. Reed also noted that the windows were tapered outward. Other stone churches on Guam with ruins still standing demonstrate this characteristic.

From the artifacts recovered, the brick and porcelain fragments are both likely from the Spanish period; traditional artifacts like stone and shell adzes were likely used by Chamorro into the Contact Period.

Significance

There are several questions about Casa Real that, when answered, contribute to the knowledge of the Contact Period on Guam and its broader context in the Pacific. It is important to understand the motivations of the Jesuits because it is through their efforts that Spain took an eventual interest in colonizing the Marianas for purposes above and beyond a supplies island for the Manila Galleons (Hezel 2000). That they put a church in Ritidian, a place that is as far and difficult to get to from the capital of the island, could be in fulfillment of the Jesuits' Formula of the Institute, but there could also be other factors that need exploring. This model for choosing mission sites is arguably duplicated throughout history in many native societies that have been colonized by Spain, including the Philippines and America (See Figure 7).



Figure 7

For future investigations, this approach combining historical and archaeological data may well be relevant in the search for and analysis of other Contact Period Jesuit mission houses on Guam. Furthermore, the ways that missionaries dealt with native populations during the Contact Period of the Philippines Latin America and southern North America can be examined for analogies to the Marianas.

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Magellan and San Vitores: Heroes or Madmen?

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Abstract: *Separated by 150 years, European explorer Ferdinand Magellan and Jesuit missionary Father Diego Luis de San Vitores have some rather unexpected similarities. They were both of noble birth, both were visionaries, both died violently in service to a greater power. In addition, both died on islands far from their places of birth. This paper examines two important European men and how they formed Marianas early contact history.*

Introduction

Ferdinand Magellan and Father Diego Luis de San Vitores, S.J. loom large in Guam and World history. Both men were briefly on Guam, the Captain-General for a few days and the Jesuit priest for nearly four years.

Separated by 150 years, these giants of their times have some rather unexpected similarities. They were both of noble birth.

Magellan, born in Portugal in 1480, spent much of his youth at court and after 1495 in the train of King Don Manoel (Beaglehole 1966:16). At this time Portuguese captains came home to tell fabulous stories of their explorations, ranging from Brazil to India to the spice islands, and Magellan was caught up in this tremendous excitement. San Vitores was born to an aristocratic Castilian family in 1627 and "through his parents and relatives had access to the highest court and church circles in the reigns of Philip IV and his widow, Queen Regent Mariana." (Rogers, 1995, 42)

Furthermore, both men were visionaries, obsessed, driven, convinced to the bone that they were in touch with God and that God was guiding their respective missions.

Both were killed violently at the hands of enraged islanders in April on beaches of small islands in 1521 and 1672.

San Vitores' death appears uncomplicated and clear. However, we have at least two versions the sparse account and the elaborate account. The former was written by Fr. Francisco Solano in a letter dated 26 April 1672 to his fellow Jesuits stationed in Manila. Solano had arrived on Guam in June 1671 and became mission superior after San Vitores' death on April 2, 1672. The new priest was anxious to inform his colleagues in Manila about the tragic loss. In his letter of 26 April just 24 days after San Vitores' murder, Solano mentioned the great fear and tension then in the air, and that six mission workers had already been murdered a day or two before San Vitores' death.

Solano also knew that Fr. Medina and his assistant Hipolito had been murdered on Saipan in 1670. Solano claimed that Hirao and Quipuha attempted to persuade other Chamorros (termed *Urritaos* by Solano) to kill him as well as Fr. Ezquerra during their visits to villages outside Agana. It appears the Chamorros were organizing to kill as many missionaries as possible. Solano's account of San Vitores' death is based on "what we heard from some natives who have been later in Tumhun." (Fr. Solano's letter in Levesque, Vol. 5: 425). San Vitores had been traveling on foot outside the safety of the mission soldiers and accompanied by Pedro Calonsor, his faithful catechist. Reportedly, the priest was looking for the elderly Estaban [Diaz] who had been San Vitores language teacher and culture informant. Not finding Estaban, San Vitores and Calonsor walked to Tumon "to administer some baptisms there" (Fr. Solano's letter in Levesque, Vol. 5: 427). Fr. Solano wrote:

> *"His Reverence had arrived at his house [Matapang's house] very early in the morning, having slept [the night] before in Fafac. And while he [Matapang] was pacing up and down in front of the house the Father asked him: "Are there any children to be baptized?" To which he answered in anger: 'There inside I have a skull. Baptize it for me with that water of God.' Another native called Hirao tired to pacify him [Matapang], telling him: 'For your life's sake let him go where he is going.' To which Matapang*

replied: 'Let us kill him.' That said, Hirao did not [immediately]consent in the innocent death of such a holy man, because nowhere in the world was there the least complaint against him, thanks to the great affability and love with which he treated all. But Matapang mocked Hirao as a coward. 'You are a coward,' he said. Hurt by this, Hirao replied: 'Let us kill him.' And beginning with the companion Pedro Calonsor, they speared him. The holy Father began to preach to them, but Matapang made fun of him and paid no attention to the holy Father. He proffered to them a big crucifix made of ivory which he was carrying with him. His Reverence told them: 'There is no other God than this.' And Matapang hurled a spear at him. Hirao wounded him with a machete, with which he [San Vitores] gave up his spirit to the Lord. They threw his venerable body into the sea, and it is said that they insulted the holy crucifix with many outrages. This is all that we have been able to know about the event from the statement of some natives, and there is no doubt about it." Fr. Solano's letter in Levesque, Vol. 5: 427-428.

Another account of San Vitores murder is provided by Father Peter Coomans who arrived on Guam as part of the second group of Jesuits in 1672. Coomans' description is nearly identical to that of Father Solano except Coomans added that Fr. San Vitores gave religious instruction to children near Matapang's hut and that Matapang and Hirao "burned the ground saturated with the glorious blood…lest the air might be infected by its foul odor," (Fr. Peter Coomans).

In contrast to Solano's report, Father Francisco Garcia's account of the San Vitores' murder was written about ten years after the event and included numerous embellishments not found in the Solano report. Garcia's account maintained that Fr. San Vitores began instructing some children nearby in order to give Matapang time to calm his anger; that Matapang was angry with God and irritated with San Vitores' teachings; that San Vitores baptized Matapang's infant daughter when Matapang momentarily absented himself from the scene; that San Vitores had nursed Matapang back to health when he had been injured some months earlier; that San Vitores was wearing three sharp iron belts; that after throwing San Vitores into the sea his body rose three times, grabbing Matapang's canoe each time and frightening him; that Matapang used fire to consume the missionaries blood; and, finally, that Matapang sold San Vitores large crucifix for 30 bags of rice (Source: "Father San Vitores's Glorious Death for Christ" p. 251, by Francisco Garcia, S.J. in *The Life and Martydom of the Venerable Father Diego Luis de San Vitores*, S.J., University of Guam, 2004).

How are Magellan and San Vitores alike?

Both men sought riches. The spice islands of the East Indies in today's Indonesia, for Magellan; and Chamorro souls that would be saved through Christianization of the Marianas for San Vitores.

Both experienced enormous privations and suffering

Both men lived as self-imposed exiles.

Both men had handicaps, Magellan a permanent limp from a leg wound he suffered in a fight in Morocco (Beaglehole, 1966, 17) and San Vitores was hopelessly short-sighted and had to be hand-guided everywhere he went.

Both men died in their forties (41 for Magellan and 45 for San Vitores).

Both were killed by angry indigenous leaders on distant islands: Matapang on Guam and Silapulapu on Mactan island.

Both faced great resistance and doubt.

Both men were persuasive salesmen of their visions…Magellan to the young King Charles of Spain…and San Vitores to the Queen regent of Spain and her confessor.

Heroes Yes. Magellan was a hero to Spain and Europe, generally because his vision and great resilience resulted in one of his five ships the *Victoria* completing the first circumnavigation of the globe. This continued Spain's exploration and colonization of the Pacific and access to its treasurers the spices, gold and silver. San Vitores was a hero to his fellow priests and to all those generations of Chamorros who have lived their Catholic faith.

Madmen Yes. Magellan was a madman to many of his crew who suffered greatly during the epic voyage to the tip of South America through the maze of straights that now bear his name, and across the vast Pacific to Guam. Those in opposition to Magellan believed there was no south-west passage to the riches of the east and that his insistence was a terrible delusion and evidence of madness.

San Vitores, yes, he was a madman to Matapang, Hirao and other Chamorros who hated the Spanish intruders and fought them to the death for several decades, 1670-1700. This hostility, although muted, continues to this day. (See "Introduction to Chief Hurao of Agana" in the lobby of the Guam Judicial Building)

Today, San Vitores is more present to Chamorros than is Magellan. His statues are on public display in at least four locations. More fundamentally, the priest has presented a dilemma to some island people. Robert Rogers has said it best. "To Chamorros, San Vitores was a savior and a conqueror, and their attitudes toward him have all the ambivalence this paradox implies. Even today in the early twenty first century, there are devout Catholic Chamorros who are still undecided whether San Vitores was a villain, one of the horseman of their apocalypse, or a hero, the man who brought them God's grace." (Rogers, 1995: 57)

This is my comparison of these two early giants. Thank you.

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Traditional Chamorro Farming Innovations during the Spanish and Philippine Contact Period on Northern Guam*

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Abstract: *During the initial period of Spanish conquest and settlement of the Marianas in the late 1600s, soldiers and clergy were often accompanied on these island frontiers by their "cultural baggage". One traditional farming technique that may have been augmented to serve the early demands on the Chamorro people to feed these new residents was the construction of permanent stone agricultural features on the limestone plateaus and rocky slopes near coastal settlements. New World crops such as the sweet potato may have been introduced in the Marianas from the Philippines as an existing component of the Spanish diet in the Western Pacific.*

Introduction

This paper suggests that archaeological evidence of Spanish and Philippine Contact Period native Chamorro innovations to traditional farming practices still exists in the jungles of northern Guam today, demonstrating the ability of indigenous residents to respond to the introduction of new crops even in the face of catastrophic culture change.

In the late 16th century, Spanish and Mexican military, clergy, merchants, and settlers brought with them many plants to accompany their creole diet and lifestyle in the Philippines: corn and tobacco from the New World, grapes and grains from the Old World to name but a few. The South American sweet potato (*Ipomea batatas*) encountered by later European explorers in Polynesia had long been

planted in Hawai`i, with the earliest archaeological example dating from 690 ± 40 years Before Present, presumably introduced by returning voyagers from the South Pacific well before the first arrival of Captain Cook in 1778. Christopher Columbus is credited with bringing it to Europe after his first voyage to the Greater Antilles in 1492.

Known by various original names including *kumara* or *camote*, the sweet potato likely arrived in Southeast Asia from Europe, first with Portuguese sailors in the spice trade of the mid-1500s and then in the Philippines with Spanish sailors of the Manila Galleon trade by the late 1500s. The tuber was introduced to the Fukien Province in China to alleviate the effects of crop failure in 1594, then eventually arrived in Japan via the Ryukyus in 1606 where it became such a mainstay of the Okinawan diet that the Dutch called it *Ryukyo imo* when they settled Java with it in 1619.

New World maize (*Zea mays*) or corn first planted by Franciscan Friar Juan Pobre de Zamora on Rota in 1602 followed a similar route from the Philippines to the Mariana Islands, as did the *Capsicum frutescens* or chili pepper in Pohnpei. Besides these new plants, native Chamorro would surely have recognized the sweet potato as a cousin to their yams, and presumably adapted their planting techniques to maximize their yield for food and trade.

Beginning with the arrival of Ferdinand Magellan on Guam in 1521 (Figure 1), the period between initial contact with Europeans and the eventual settlement of Spaniards in 1668 was undoubtedly one of considerable change in Chamorro culture, if only recorded in oral histories. The pace of change accelerated when the Manila Galleons and later their predators began visiting the island regularly after 1568 on their way from Acapulco in Mexico to the Philippines.



Figure 1. Guam Timeline for Prehistoric and Historic Eras (after Dixon et al. 2011)

Archival documents only provide fleeting glimpses of traditional society during that last century of native autonomy however, often told by shipwrecked sailors or priests jumping ship. Most of what is recorded in the brutal decades that followed chronicles the Spanish struggle to impose first a new religion in the native villages (Figure 2) and then *La Reduccion* on a fading way of life, especially in northern Guam, while the Chamorro themselves struggled to adapt to the demands of a new culture just to survive.

Figure 2- Churches and Missions on Guam circa 1672 (Courtesy of MARC)

What is apparent is that the Chamorro quickly adopted iron for their own uses and they also realized when and where the Galleons and other vessels were likely to land every year and what they wanted in exchange food and water being the primary goal of such commerce for the Spanish. While vessels did not initially arrive every year off northern Guam, it is safe to assume that coastal residents of that region profited differentially from such exchange of food for iron while other residents attempted to engage in such trade vicariously through family and clan relationships.

One traditional farming technique that may have been augmented to serve this early exchange and later demands to support resident Spanish clergy was the construction of permanent stone agricultural features on the limestone plateau above and in rocky slopes near coastal settlements, perhaps to grow introduced crops easily preserved for trade such as the sweet potato which were already cultivated in the Americas and in the Philippines as one component of Spanish maritime provisioning in the Pacific.

Moderately large coastal villages had developed by about A.D. 1400 at several embayments with sheltered waters and a fringing reef below Ritidian and Jinapson Points, but the demand on plateau resources may well have been reached before Contact. The few habitations with *latte* stones found near inland pottery scatters and their associated fields divided the native forest into a quilt-like pattern of ongoing and fallow land use from major trails. That this division between villages may not have always been considered equitable is suggested by the presence of sling stones near some field systems.

After European Contact in 1521, the shifting pattern of swidden farming and harvesting native trees may have become inadequate for maintaining coastal Latte Period settlements during cyclical droughts in the late 1600s, as suggested by the construction of more permanent features in northern Guam (Figure 3) such as low cobble walls associated with stone piles or mounds of various sizes (Figure 4), and small stone circles near pottery scatters and possible trails or footpaths.

Similar features sometimes with cobble platforms or lined depressions have been recorded at the end of WWII Northwest Field, on the slopes above Tarague Beach and above Ague Cove, on the coastal terrace at Pagat Point, Janum, and Pati Point, at Mochom in Huchunao, and on the plateau above in the Guam Raceway Park, at Asdonlucas, at Sabanon Pagat, at Yigo, and at Lumuna.

Such features have yet to be excavated given the paucity of soil often observed underneath, but a radiocarbon date of A.D. 1430-1660 obtained from charcoal in a fire hearth located near one wall in the Guam Raceway Park suggests to the authors "that these features may have been built near the end of the Latte Phase or at the beginning of the Historic Period". Interviews with Yigo farmer Miguel Taitano suggested the rock lined depressions might be where cycad or *fadang* nuts were collected historically. Some linear walls in Tarague have also been suggested to be Spanish-era *estancia* property boundaries, since many seem to either cross-cut the



Figure 3. Location of Ritidian Point and Related Sites in Northern Guam.



Figure 4: Agricultural Feature Types (after Dixon et al. 2010)

slopes on a seaward orientation, or parallel existing topography and historic roads at higher elevations.

Pigafetta, writing as scribe on Magellan's voyage when it made landfall on Guam, mentioned *camotes* being presented to the sailors, although this American Indian word seems to have been a universal term for tubers during the early period of global oceanic discovery. Primary accounts of subsequent visits to the Marianas by Espinosa in 1522, by Salazar and Urdaneta in 1526, and by Villalobos in 1543 do not mention tubers, although Legazpi's pilot Rodriguez in 1564 mentions that "Every man has…two or three yams or sweet potatoes", indicating the unfamiliarity of Spanish visitors with the diversity of Pacific root crops.

Later visits to the Marianas by Lope Martin and Juan Martinez in 1566 and by Quiros and Bermudez in 1596 do not mention tubers, although Spanish sailors were by then familiar with various island groups and their subsistence products in Micronesia, Melanesia, and the South Pacific. By this time, Dutch and British privateers seeking Manila Galleons in the western Pacific were well aware that the "isles of the Ladrones [where] they find water, plantanes, and potato-roots".

If sweet potatoes (plus corn, chili peppers, melons, and citruses) were cultivated in the Philippines for provisioning the Manila Galleon trade by the 1580s, then it is possible they arrived on Guam from the west rather than the east and perhaps before initial Spanish settlement of Hagatna in 1668. More likely, *camote* were already part of the creole diet introduced by Jesuit priests and their Philippine assistants to native communities where they resided such as Ritidian by 1674. At the moment we cannot say where such foods were grown outside of Colonial Hagatna based on archaeological evidence alone.

While possible contractions of inland settlement in southern Guam during the 1500s and 1600s may reflect local responses to regional climatic shifts and unpredictable weather, the attraction of early Spanish trade and later clerical residency on the northern coast of the island may have actually spurred the adoption of new plants and farming techniques by clans eager for a piece of the trading exchanges. By 1684 however, only a few coastal villages were still occupied on the northern coastline when inhabitants were then forcibly removed.

Coincidentally, or perhaps not, these particular inhabitants were resettled in and around the southern village of Pago, where similar archaeological remains have

recently been identified by Chamorro archaeologists from the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as "typical of *gaddo'* farming in Saipan", their grandparents using rocks and hibiscus leaves as soil building materials for yam farming.

If such traditional techniques were already in existence when the first Jesuit priests and their Philippine assistants arrived in northern Guam, it would take no great leap of faith (no pun intended) for local inhabitants to transfer this knowledge to growing what they would surely recognize as one of a large family of tubers they already recognized.

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Islands in the Stream of Empire: Spain's 'Reformed' Imperial Policy and the First Proposals to Colonize the Mariana Islands, 1565-1569

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Abstract: *The earliest proposals to colonize Guam and Rota were motivated by Spain's commercial ambitions in Asia, not religious fervor, and reflected the imperial strategy of Andres de Urdaneta, Miguel Lopez de Legaspi and King Philip II. Seeking to exploit the islands' geostrategic value in conducting Asian-American trade, their views were shaped by an ostensibly "reformed" approach to indigenous populations that emphasized "humane" treatment because of the severe criticisms of Spain's brutal conquest and colonization of New World peoples. However, the Crown's imperial policy continued to reserve the right to use as much force as required to conquer and colonize islanders who resisted Spanish settlement, conversion to Catholicism or the Crown's authority. Though their plans were not effected in their lifetimes, aspects of their strategies came into force of their own cultural and economic inertia, making Guam and Rota a major crossroads for European ships and unwitting candidates for evangelization.*

Introduction

The earliest Spanish proposals to colonize Guam and Rota were made a century before Father Diego Luis de San Vitores launched his spiritual conquest of the islands. Motivated principally by Spain's commercial ambitions in Asia, rather than religious fervor, the initial plans of imperial strategists, such as Andres de Urdaneta, Miguel Lopez de Legaspi and King Philip II, sought to exploit the islands' geo-strategic value in establishing Asian-American commerce.

Their ideas reflected an ostensibly reformed Spanish approach to imperial conquest and the treatment of indigenous populations that urged mildness, moderation and measured response. This new colonial policy was a reaction to the forceful criticisms of Dominican clerics regarding Spain's bloody New World conquests and brutal treatment of the Carib and Taino peoples of the Caribbean and the populations of the Aztec and Inca empires on the mainland. Spanish conquistadors had caused the deaths of millions through warfare and European diseases and enslaved large swathes of the surviving populations to work the seized agricultural lands and gold and silver mines.

Bartolomé de Las Casas, a former missionary in the New World and the most effective Dominican critic, vehemently opposed Spain's brutal wars of conquest and colonization and roundly criticized the Spanish Crown for allowed atrocities against the indigenous peoples. He argued that the Amerindians possessed the same "natural rights" as Christian Europeans, including rights to their land, labor, national sovereignty and freedom of conscience to choose a religion. 1

Spain did not have the right to conquer and enslave these people and force their conversion to Christianity, Las Casas declared, urging successive Spanish monarchs, especially Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, to reform the Crown's colonial policy and return the Americas to their native inhabitants. Las Casas' public pleadings also influenced the Papacy's position on the treatment of New World indigene, leading to the papal bull *Sublimis Deus* in 1537. This influential statement proclaimed that Amerindians were truly human, capable of receiving the "true faith" and should not be deprived of their liberty or property, even if they were not Christians.

This concerted attack struck at the heart of Spain's colonial possessions and prerogatives as well as royal revenues from the New World, including tribute from grants of native lands to Spanish conquistadors and settlers and the forced native labor systems that accompanied them the *encomiendas* and *repartiamentos*. 2 Disturbed by this vigorous public critique and genuinely concerned about the treatment of his Amerindian subjects, Charles V turned to Franciscus de Victoria, a Dominican theologian and legal advisor to the Crown, for his views on the legality of Spain's title to New World lands and the morality of the forced native labor systems. Charles V also convened the 1550-1551 Valladolid court debates on these issues, pitting Las Casas and the secular scholar Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, who argued the colonists' position, defending Spain's rights to instruct the "uncivilized" Amerindians in Spanish civilization and convert these "pagans" to Christianity. 3

Victoria's critique, which in part attempted to reconcile the divergent views that had found their clearest expression with Las Casas and Sepúlveda, began by upholding the "rationality" and "natural rights" of indigenous people and rejecting the doctrines of discovery and papal donation of "new" lands to European monarchs in return for converting the natives to Christianity. Under political pressure, however, Victoria bent to the royal will over the years and systematically rationalized Spain's conquests and plundering of Amerindian lands, labor and

property. In one of the earliest attempts to construct a system of international law, he asserted that native populations were obligated by the "natural law of nations" to allow free access to their territory and accept Spanish settlements, commerce and missionaries.

Victoria argued that Amerindians forfeited their "natural rights" if they committed acts that Europeans viewed as "barbarous" or "uncivilized" and violated "natural law" if they refused to allow Christians into their lands, would not receive religious instruction, or harmed missionaries or native converts. Moreover, those who rejected the "true faith" and "superior" Spanish civilization, Victoria concluded, nullified the presumption of native rationality, creating a right of guardianship over those who resisted. Spain therefore had a duty to govern Amerindian communities and convert them to Catholicism and could use "just war" and property appropriation to accomplish this "civilizing" mission. Such warfare should be limited, he maintained, "to the measures required to attain the legitimate objectives of peaceful trade and missionary work." 4

This obviously equivocal but politically useful line of reasoning informed revisions of imperial policy, particularly under Charles V, whose New Laws of 1542 abolished native slavery, attempted to restrict the power of *encomiendas* and *repartiamentos* and set a date when such land grants would be ended. Spanish colonists in the New World greeted the New Laws with widespread protests and armed resistance, effectively preventing their implementation in Mexico and Peru and leading to the 1552 reissue of the laws in a weaker version. Though outlawed, slavery was replaced by a form of agrarian serfdom that left the Spanish colonists in control of indigenous land and labor. The New Laws were incorporated into the Crown's 1573 Royal Orders Regarding the Discovery, Settlement and Pacification of the Indies and both statues were codified in the Laws of the Indies, which guided Spanish colonial policy into the 19th century. 5

However benevolent in intention and sincere in expression, in practice the new colonial policy only marginally restricted the Spanish use of force to conquer and exploit indigenous populations. It clearly reserved the right of Spanish officials to use whatever military force required in their colonial expeditions and to employ *encomiendas* and *repartiamentos* to extract wealth from New World resources. It also provided a "civilizing" rationalization for these exploitations. Under the new policy, there were to be no more conquests, only "pacifications." The only proviso was that

the "new conquistadors" gain the Crown's approval for their expeditions and follow royal guidance in carrying out their colonizations.

Urdaneta's Plan: A Forward Deployed Base

As Crown Prince, Philip II had followed the Las Casas and Victoria critiques and the development of the New Laws. Succeeding Charles V in 1556, he continued his father's ambiguous colonial policy, applying it to his desire to tap the riches of Asia, especially the spice trade then controlled by the Portuguese, by extending Spain's westward dominion. He ordered his viceroy in New Spain to mount another expedition to solve the circumnavigation problems of the Pacific Ocean, establish a trading colony near the Spice Islands (Moluccas), and launch direct Asian-American commerce.

As part of that initiative, the first Spanish strategist to propose the colonization of Guam was the Augustinian Friar Andres de Urdaneta, the most knowledgeable European navigator of the Pacific and the senior pilot by royal mandate on Miguel Lopez de Legaspi's 1565 expedition to the Philippines. During the fleet's January 21 to February 3 visit to Guam, Urdaneta, who also served as the expedition's "Protector of the Indians" under the reformed colonial policy, counseled Legaspi on "benevolent treatment" of indigenous people. 6

Before anchoring off Guam's southwest coast, Legaspi issued orders reflecting that guidance, sternly warning his nearly 400 crewmen and soldiers not to go ashore without permission, show force or harm any islanders or their property, including their plantations and fields. He vowed "severe punishment" for infractions and instructed his officers to carry out his order "under pain of losing their commissions."

At a meeting of expedition leaders during the visit, Urdaneta surprised officials by proposing that the fleet not proceed further west, make a permanent settlement on Guam and immediately dispatch one of the galleons for the arduous task of discovering the return route to New Spain the primary goal of the expedition and key to direct Asian-American commerce. He argued that Guam, an unmistakable high island, had been visited by three Spanish expeditions and its location was well charted. The island had ample land, perennial streams, good leeward anchorages, abundant food staples and was strategically located to reach Japan, the China coast, the *Filipinas* (Leyte and Samar) and the Moluccas. 7

Guam would make a useful forward base for further Spanish explorations in search of East Asian commercial opportunities and was advantageously situated for dispatching the ungainly galleons, which could safely maneuver in the Philippine Sea's seasonal southwesterly winds that Urdaneta believed would allow them to reach 30 to 40 degrees north latitude. Prevailing westerly winds in those higher reaches would then carry the vessels across the North Pacific to the coast of New Spain, completing the circum-Pacific navigation Spain had sought since Magellan's voyage.

Most importantly for Urdaneta, a Guam settlement would assure that the initial Crown colony in the region would be in Spanish territory acknowledged under agreements with the Papacy and Portugal. Urdaneta and his fellow Augustinians believed that the expedition's intended destination *Filipinas* was in Portuguese territory, according to the terms of the 1529 Treaty of Zaragoza. 8

In that pact, the cash-strapped Charles V, frustrated by the inability of several Spanish expeditions to establish a Spice Islands trade and preoccupied with European affairs, "pawned" to the Portuguese Crown his claims "in the Moluccas and other islands and seas" for 350,000 ducats (about US $130 million). The treaty provided a "buy-back" provision that allowed Spain to redeem the "pawn" provided Spanish ships did not trespass the Mortgaged Area. 9

However, the precise dimensions of that area were unknown, so the treaty provided for joint survey voyages to chart those boundaries, and proposed a line separating Spanish and Portuguese realms in the region about 900 miles east of the Moluccas. The treaty specifically mentioned *Las Velas*, an early Spanish name for Guam and Rota, asserting they were on the Spanish side of that line.

Urdaneta also believed Guam could help solve major geographic questions regarding the delineation of Spanish and Portuguese realms in East Asia, including the location of the Papal Line of Demarcation in the Orient. This meridian continued the Papal Line of Demarcation in the Atlantic, drawn in 1493 and moved further west in 1494 to delimit Spanish and Portuguese hemispheres of influence.

Where the antipodal Line of Demarcation fell on the far side of the globe could not be accurately charted until the true circumference of the Earth was known, requiring an accurate gauge of the width of the Pacific Ocean. The Spanish maintained that the line ran through the tip of the Malay Peninsula, placing the

Moluccas in Spanish territory; while the Portuguese held that the line was further east, running through the Western Pacific between Guam and the Philippines.

With the distance between New Spain and Guam more accurately calculated by the Legaspi expedition, Urdaneta believed, future surveys could determine with greater precision the distance from Guam to the Philippines and Moluccas. These findings would then enable Spanish mapmakers and navigators to correctly estimate the width of the Pacific and better chart the Papal Line of Demarcation in the Orient. 10

Urdaneta's proposal for Guam reflected his familiarity with the island and his vision of its role in enabling Spain to expand westward over its papal-designated sphere of influence. He had first visited Guam in 1526 on the *Santa Maria de la Vitoria,* which stopped at the island on Spain's first attempt to exploit Magellan's route, and learned about the archipelago directly from the beachcomber Gozalvo Alvarez de Vigo, a member of Magellan's expedition who had sojourned in the Marianas for four years.

Urdaneta had then spent eight years in the Moluccas, evaluating trading opportunities, Portuguese strength and potential Spanish alliances with local rulers. After his return to New Spain in 1536, he maintained his interest in Pacific exploration by studying the navigational accounts of Spanish voyages that had failed to secure a viable trading base in the Spice Islands or find the return route.

By the mid 16th century, Urdaneta, who had become an Augustinian friar, was advising the Crown of a strategy he was convinced could solve the problems of circumnavigating the Pacific. He proposed three possible westward routes north, central and southern using seasonal wind patterns, with the chosen course depending on the time the expedition sailed from the Pacific coast of New Spain. He also described his strategy for using the seasonal winds of the Western Pacific for the return route. 11

Guam was a key to Urdaneta's plan of operations for the central crossing from New Spain, via a series of navigational and provisioning way-stations across the Pacific. Because determining longitude was then largely educated guesswork relying on dead-reckoning, these stations would allow ships to more precisely chart their progress across the vast ocean. San Bartolomé (Taongi in the Marshalls) or possibly Wake Island would be the way-station in the central Pacific, while Guam would serve that important function for the western Pacific.

Urdaneta's Objection: A Base Too Far

Urdaneta had also expressed his belief that the *Filipinas* were most likely in Portuguese territory — part of the area mortgaged in 1529 — and vowed not to participate in an expedition aimed at a permanent settlement there. He believed that would be a trespass, violating the Treaty of Zaragoza and nullifying use of its "buy-back" provision. He recognized, however, that the treaty authorized temporarily entering that territory, due to storms that drove vessels off course or damaged their ability to navigate, or to rescue stranded members of previous Spanish expeditions. 12

Urdaneta understood that while searching for castaways or repairing damaged vessels and acquiring food stores, such expeditions could trade with and cultivate friendly islanders, learn about available trade products and commercial opportunities and then conduct the discovery voyage for the return route. If the Spanish Crown decided that the findings of such an expedition warranted follow-up, the "pawned" area could be redeemed and a new expedition could make a permanent settlement in the *Filipinas*.

At the personal request of Philip II, Urdaneta had agreed to help lead the Legaspi expedition because he believed it was essentially a reconnaissance, an exploration and intelligence gathering voyage to assess the potential for bases on New Guinea's northwest coast or temporarily enter the *Filipinas* and then launch the return route. He believed the expedition would inform the King's future moves regarding the *Filipinas* and not seek to immediately establish a colony there. Partly because of Urdaneta's opposition to such a settlement, Legaspi was given sealed orders and instructed not to open them until his expedition was 300 miles at sea. 13

These orders mirrored Philip II's original 1559 directive to the Viceroy of New Spain, Don Luis de Velasco: "On no account are the ships to enter the Moluccas in contravention of the agreement with the King of Portugal, but rather proceed to islands adjacent to that area, for example *Felipinas* which are outside the Mortgage Line and are reported to produce spices." Legaspi was authorized to establish a settlement there. 14

Urdaneta was extremely disappointed by Legaspi's orders to sail by a southern route directly to the *Filipinas* and to establish a colony, protesting that he and other Augustinian friars had been tricked. By the time the fleet reached the western Pacific, however, Urdaneta was presented with an opportunity to regain the

initiative for his plan. By then, fleet pilots significantly disagreed on the distance the ships had covered, their precise location and which direction to sail, requiring Legaspi to make a command decision not provided for in his instructions.

Urdaneta believed the southern route (through the Caroline Islands) mandated by the King, which had been used by the unsuccessful Villaobus expedition in 1542, was poorly charted, rife with errors on the locations of islands and sailing distances, and would trap the expedition on Mindanao's windward coast. He counseled Legaspi — his cousin, fellow Basque and close friend — to alter course by ascending several degrees of latitude before resuming a westward heading. Within five days, the correction brought the fleet to Guam — Urdaneta's proposed way-station on the central crossing. 15

As an opportunity to avoid trespassing into Portuguese territory, Urdaneta's proposal for a settlement on Guam found favor with his fellow Augustinian friars as well as virtually all of the expedition leaders attending the meeting, according to eyewitness accounts. However, Legaspi was unconvinced, responding firmly that his orders directed him unequivocally to the *Filipinas* to establish a settlement if possible and to launch the search for a return route from there. For Legaspi, the goal of the expedition was not to solve cosmological issues or settle legal disputes but to find a *realpolitik* way to establish direct contact between Asian entrepôts and New Spain, making the Kingdom of Castile competitive with Portugal in developing potentially lucrative trade with the China coast, Japan and the Spice Islands. 16

A puzzling feature of Urdaneta's proposal for a Guam settlement is how his plan could have succeeded without violent confrontations with some of the island's major villages — an outcome the "reformed" colonial policy and the expedition's Augustinians ostensibly sought to avoid. Neither Urdaneta, who had acquired a sparse Chamorro vocabulary with the help of the beachcomber de Vigo, nor the expedition's Moluccan interpreter, Jorge Pacheco, was able to intelligibly converse in the Chamorro language during the two-week visit. Sign language, gestures and pantomime provided only the most rudimentary communication. By their actions, the Chamorros had demonstrated their preference for trading offshore from canoes, refusal to board the galleons and repeated resistance to Spanish onshore incursions and expeditions. 17

Legaspi's landings and surveys had regularly precipitated violent confrontations. He claimed the islands for the King of Spain with a drawn-out beach drama that

was probably incomprehensible to the Chamorros. His officers conducted coastal surveys of bays and anchorages; and sent armed parties ashore for water and firewood and to search inland for gold, silver and spices. These incursions regularly met spirited resistance. In the earliest, islanders tried to repulse a watering party supported by the expedition's vessels, ringing the cove and attacking the ships' crews and shore party with sling stones and lances. The Spanish fired warning shots from arquebuses, dispersing the warriors. [18]

Armed Spanish survey parties met similar confrontations, one officer noting, "At each village the frigate came to, islanders met them with the slings, hurling a shower of stones at us to prevent our landing." Despite this resistance, soldiers forced their way ashore at several villages, skirmishing with Chamorro warriors who "attacked with such spirit" before arquebus fire "forced them to retreat in disorder." More than 500 islanders reportedly were dispersed in these encounters and "a few of them lost their lives."[19]

Seeking to control the foreign visitors, Chamorros from southwest coastal villages sought to keep them as much as possible offshore and at arm's length, while actively trading for iron goods in that more secure venue. In one instance, while some islanders were fighting onshore with Legaspi's men, others who were trading at the Spanish ships "after leaving aboard their canoes would go ashore to fight with our men, to be replaced in the canoes by those who had been fighting who then came alongside to trade. At all times, they kept their weapons in their hands." [20]

Legaspi's visit had ended on an exceptionally violent note, when he retaliated for the islanders' killing of a member of a watering party by landing 100 soldiers in a southwest bay, where they captured and killed several men, hung their bodies from trees and burned nearby villages.

Under Philip II's artfully ambivalent policy for dealing with indigenous peoples, Urdaneta and Legaspi had made an inherently conflicted effort to avoid provoking violence. Offshore, the Spanish offered gifts, unusually strict officer and crew discipline and copious amounts of iron goods to secure needed supplies without precipitating confrontations. Onshore, however, convinced they were doing the bidding of their God and their King, Spanish officers considered it their prerogative under the "natural law of nations" to land soldiers, forcibly if necessary, explore the island for potential wealth and appropriate what they wanted --

regardless of Chamorro opposition. These commercially-inspired incursions precipitated numerous conflicts and islander deaths.

Under the new colonial policy, indigenous opposition was not a major impediment, much less a deciding factor, in decisions to advance Spanish imperial objectives. Despite the Crown's mandate for "humane" treatment of indigenous peoples, the expedition used whatever force deemed necessary when the Chamorros refused to accept a Spanish onshore presence or attempted to impede the King's agents.

To the degree that Legaspi's visit to Guam was a test of the "enlightened" Spanish colonial policy, it demonstrated that the noble objectives of the new approach, when confronted by the realities of cross-cultural encounters and indigenous territoriality, readily gave way to the old preference for physical violence, military assault and bloody reprisals.

Legaspi's Plan: The Wealth of the Way-Station Islands

Urdaneta's proposal, his overall strategy for the central Pacific passage and his vision of Guam's role in Philip II's Asian trading enterprise were not lost on Legaspi. As Captain General of the expedition, he recognized the island's value as a navigational and provisioning stop on the three-month, 9,000-mile tradewind crossing from New Spain to the Philippines. And he sought to acquire Guam and Rota as part of his reward for extending the Crown's dominion in the Pacific.

During its initial years in the Philippines, Legaspi's expedition had established a base at Cebu, discovered the return route, resisted a Portuguese fleet that tried to oust the Spanish colonists from the islands, negotiated alliances with local chiefs, secured food supplies by force if necessary and gathered intelligence on local products and trade patterns in the archipelago. During this time, he repeatedly pleaded for royal guidance and support. 21

Legaspi's official requests also sought compensation for his efforts, because he had spent most of his personal fortune, including selling property in New Spain, to fund the King's enterprise. Trading monopolies and resource development privileges in the islands, including *encomiendas* and *repartiamentos,* were typical royal methods of rewarding those who had expanded "the Kingdom of Castile through trade, commerce and other lawful means." Legaspi's petitions to Philip II from the Philippines, delivered to the Crown as early as 1567 and reiterated in

Madrid by his son Melchior in 1568, sought titles, authorities, compensation and trading privileges in the Philippines, some of which New Spain's Viceroy Velasco had agreed to before his death in 1564. 22

Using Magellan's pejorative name for the islands, Legaspi also petitioned that "two of the Ladrone Islands" be granted to him, with the title of Governor and Captain-General, "provided he conquer and colonize them at his own cost." Legaspi noted that the settlement of Guam or Rota "would be of very much use to your majesty as a way-station and shelter for the ships that will ply those western seas … [sailing] from New Spain to the Philippine Islands." 23

Legaspi also asked that he, his sons and successors be granted "one-twelfth of all incomes from mines, gold and silver, precious stones, and fruits in the Ladrones; and two fisheries, one of pearls and the other of fish, in the same islands." In addition, he sought honors and compensation for his grandson, Felipe de Salcedo, for his services as captain of the flagship galleon on the outward voyage and in the discovery of the return route.

Perhaps anticipating a favorable royal response, Legaspi reportedly directed Salcedo, then in command of the galleon *San Pablo,* to stop at Guam on the 1568 return voyage to New Spain and learn if any of the islands had peppers, cloves or other valuable resources. Salcedo brought the 400-ton *San Pablo*, a prototypical Manila Galleon and then *capitana* (principle vessel) of the fleet, to Guam in mid-August, carrying 40,000 pounds of Mindanao cinnamon and samples of Philippine gold and Ming porcelain. On August 15, while anchored off the island's southwest coast, the vessel was hit by a violent storm during the night. Though the ship and cargo were lost and the survey mission aborted, the 132-member complement survived the disaster, built a bark from the wreckage and safely returned to Cebu in November. 24

Part of Legaspi's motivation in seeking Guam and Rota may also have been to use the islands as a hedge against an uncertain future as a "fall-back base" in case the expedition was forced out of the Philippines by a Portuguese fleet or ordered out by a chagrined Spanish King who had been caught trespassing. Legaspi's letters from Cebu reflected his anguish over the lack of clear direction from Philip II. Should he push ahead with a permanent colony or wait for further directions from the King? Would New Spain send men, munitions, food supplies and ships to bolster the settlement or abandon the costly effort? Should the fleet leave the

Filipinas, relocating outside the Mortgaged Area to Guam and Rota or return to New Spain? 25

This uncertainty had led Legaspi to creatively dissimulate when confronted in September 1568 by a Portuguese squadron sent from the Moluccas to oust him. He protested to the Portuguese commander that he had entered islands that were long claimed by the Spanish Crown outside the Mortgaged Area. He lacked food, supplies and serviceable ships to transport his soldiers out of the islands and was earnestly ransoming Spanish castaways from earlier expeditions. Fortifications had been erected only because his men heard that a naval force was coming from the Moluccas to attack the expedition. He awaited orders from his King and could not accompany the Portuguese to the Moluccas, as they demanded, because Philip II had prohibited the expedition from entering the area mortgaged in the 1529 Treaty of Zaragoza. 26

Philip II, also known as The Prudent, had adopted a cautious, wait-and-see attitude on his Philippine enterprise. While remaining silent about Legaspi's presence in the disputed islands, the Crown would determine its course based on the quality of the Portuguese reaction. If they forcefully responded to the new colony, either militarily or in the international legal arena, the King could tactfully withdraw the expedition, claiming it was a mission to rescue Spanish castaways. If his Iberian neighbor showed negligible concern or did not have the resources to protect its Moluccan base while forcing Legaspi out of the *Filipinas*, the gradual strengthening of the Cebu settlement and consolidation of its position would eventually present Lisbon with a strategic *fait accompli*. 27

Philip II's Plan: All the Mildness and Moderation Possible

In 1568, Philip II granted most of Legaspi's requests concerning Guam and Rota, providing detailed royal instructions the following year on how to establish and administer the colony. That guidance, similar to what he provided for the colonization of the *Filipinas*, reflected the views of the theologian Victoria and exemplifies how the Crown expected its new colonial policy to be implimented by its far-flung agents.

The King authorized Legaspi to "take and seize possession" of the islands, provided he observed "in toto the instructions and provisions which have been issued by us in regard to the course to be followed in the said colonization…." Philip II granted this royal license and permission "in consideration of the many expenses that you

have incurred in their discovery, and the hardships you have endured." Legaspi was appointed "Governor and Captain General of the … Ladrone islands and of all the villages that you shall settle therein for the rest of your life." [28]

The King also bestowed on Legaspi the prestigious title of *adelantado* of the Ladrone Islands "for yourself and for your heirs and successors forever." The title, designating a regional military commander charged with conquering and governing frontier territories, carried with it numerous "honors, favors, rewards, licenses, fees, salaries, preeminences, prerogatives and immunities." Territories governed by *adelantados* were typically outside the jurisdiction of a viceroy or *audiencia*, allowing these frontier commanders to communicate directly with the Council of the Indies. [29] Because Philip II was attempting to "low key" the Spanish presence in the *Filipinas*, this title may also have sought to provide Legaspi the higher recognition, authority, increased rewards and freedom of action needed for his overall efforts in carrying out the King's enterprise, without officially committing to the conquest and colonization of the *Filipinas*. In addition, the King authorized Legaspi an annual salary of 2,000 ducats ($750,000) and made him a one-time grant of 2,000 ducats "in consideration of [his] services…past and present in his expedition, and the loss that he has received to his property in a ship [*San Pablo*] which sunk." [30]

Legaspi was granted all executive, legislative and judicial powers, could appoint and remove all colonial officers, and "try, dispatch, and sentence all the suits and causes, both civil and criminal, which shall arise and occur in the said islands, coasts, lands and villages that you shall settle." This authority applied to both the colonists and the Chamorro inhabitants.

In recruiting settlers for Guam and Rota, Legaspi should "endeavor to take the most virtuous and Christian people possible, and those who shall be best fitted for the said colonization." To help attract appropriate colonists, Legaspi was authorized to offer "*repartimientos* of Indians … to those persons who shall go to make the said settlement, in accordance with their services and the quality of the persons…."

The settlers should select sites and locations that are "healthful and fertile, and abounding in wood, water and pasturage for cattle." While the chief capitals and seaports of the islands were to be Crown property, Legaspi "shall see that…[other] land be apportioned to the colonists, but you shall not occupy or take possession of any private property of the Indians." To accomplish this, the initial settlements

should be "somewhat distant from the districts and locations where the Indians may have their settlements, pastures, and fields so that all the above said may be done without harming them at all. On the contrary, thorough good treatment must be shown them."

In erecting their houses, the colonists should "[make] them in a sort of stronghold, where they may defend themselves and their flocks if necessary, in case the Indians try to attack them." When the houses were built and the fields sown, "the people should try to discover minerals and other things in which they will be benefitted. They shall cultivate the land and enrich it with new plants of vines and fruit trees for its support and gain."

In dealing with the indigenous people, Legaspi "shall endeavor with great care to see that the Spaniards do no harm and show no force to the Indians, and that they do not wound them or do them any other evil or harm, or deprive them of their possessions, but they shall show them the utmost good treatment." If any settler "offend the Indians, then you and your captains shall punish him not to continue such actions. If he be...negligent in this, then you shall have him punished with great rigor; for this…we desire greatly, and if this not be obeyed we shall consider ourselves greatly disserved."

Trade was seen as primary means of developing positive relations with the islanders. Legaspi should "see to it that the citizens and religious… trade and communicate with the natives … make friends with them…[and] provide the Indians with the articles that they need, and shall endeavor also to get from the Indians the things that are needed from them."

The conversion of the Chamorros to Christianity was inextricably linked with submission to the Spanish Crown. Legaspi and his colonists should take special care "in furthering the conversion of the Indian natives of that country to our holy Catholic faith, and their good treatment; for that is most important to the service of God our Lord and mine…. The religious shall endeavor to convert them and allure them to the faith, and to have them recognize us as sovereign king and lord….."

Legaspi was authorized to take "four of the religious at present in the [*Filipinas*], and if you do not have them, you shall take two seculars who must be persons of good life and morals, fit to give the instruction, and to administer the holy sacraments…You shall send religious and other good persons to instruct and

persuade the Indians to receive our faith…[and] see to it that they…endeavor to collect the Indians in villages so that they may be instructed better…They shall reduce the Indians to a civilized life, and shall endeavor to separate them from their vices, sins and evil customs."

Cultivating Chamorro allies was a key to protecting the colony. The colonists should "endeavor (for such is my will) to have the Indians live near them in villages, and shall defend them and help them to defend themselves against those who try to harm them." If the Chamorros near the colonial settlements "should become friends because of such good efforts and persuasions, so that they give the religious permission to enter to teach them and to preach to them the law of Christ, you shall see that they do it." If the colonists succeed in persuading some islanders "to adopt our holy Catholic faith willingly, and to render submission to us… you shall order that they be exempt from tribute for ten years." Philip II clarified, however, that after that decade of exemption, the islanders would be subject to *repartimientos*.

For Chamorros who refuse to listen to religious instruction, oppose conversion or mistreat those who listen to it, "you shall endeavor by all good means possible…to prevent it, so that the preaching of the gospel may not cease for that reason. You shall proceed in this with all manner of discretion, kindness and moderation." If local leaders still refuse to admit the religious to preach after being petitioned several times, "you shall make a report of it and send it to our Council [of the Indies] with the most justifiable testimony that you have of what has been done, in order that we may have you ordered as to what course you are to pursue."

The royal guidance also included protocols for dealing with concerted indigenous opposition to the settlement. The colonists were generally expected to conduct themselves "that you may not come to blows with them nor with any other persons unless you should be provoked, and in your own defense….[but] If the natives endeavor to prevent the Spanish settlement…"they must be told that the men are not trying to settle there…to do them any harm or wrong, or to seize their possessions, but only to have friendship with them and teach them to live in a civilized manner and recognize God, and to expound to them the law of Jesus Christ by which they will be saved."

Before any military action against Chamorro opposition, that message and warning must be given three times "by the tongue of the religious who shall tell and declare

it." If the indigenous people still refuse to consent to the settlement, "the colonists shall endeavor to settle and shall defend themselves from the said natives without doing them other injury than that necessary for their defense and for making the said settlement. All the mildness and moderation possible shall be observed in the said defense."

In a Spanish Stream of Empire

Legaspi's plans for the islands and the King's decrees for their colonization were never carried out in their lifetimes, of course, as the loss of the *San Pedro* ended interest in making Guam or other islands in the archipelago a stop on the regular return voyages. Moreover, after Portugal's tepid response to Legaspi's Cebu settlement, Philip II pushed ahead with his colonization of the *Filipinas*, providing the additional resources needed.

From then on, the Spanish colonists focused their energies on exploiting the Philippines' ample resources and co-opting the Asian trading nexus at Manila, which strengthened their military position *vis a vis* the Portuguese. Legaspi moved his base to Manila in 1671 but died a year later. His successors did not pursue his grants and authorities for the "way-station" islands of Guam and Rota. By 1580, the Spanish and Portuguese crowns were united under Philip II, rendering the trespass a non-issue.

However, the Marianas' perceived geostrategic value for the galleon commerce as a navigational and provisioning way-station and haven for the trade ships and their crews became a reality during the next century without a Spanish colony. Moreover, Philip II's colonial policies for Guam and Rota foreshadowed the strategy used in the Marianas a century later, especially the pivotal role of missionaries in persistently promoting islander conversion and concomitant political submission to the Spanish Crown.

As the Spanish galleon trade developed, Guam and Rota became a regular stop for Acapulco ships carrying New World bullion and coin to finance the Manila colony's purchase of Chinese silk and Moluccan spices. British privateers and Dutch expeditions followed the Spanish wake to the islands, hunting the silver argosies and seeking bases to gain a share of Asian trade. From the perspective of European seafaring nations, the Pacific Ocean was a Spanish Lake in the 16th and 17th centuries, with Urdaneta's central crossing and return route as the royal seaway

connecting its American and Asian shores and Guam and Rota as the major way-station on that imperial stream.

More than 100 European ships visited the Marianas in this period, making the islands an eagerly sought provisioning stop that offered relief from the vessels' putrid water and insect-infested food. These numerous encounters with visiting ships provided regular trading opportunities for willing Chamorros, who exchanged fresh water, antiscorbutic fruit, marine protein and complex carbohydrate crops for iron goods. When storm-beaten Spanish galleons wrecked in the Marianas (1601 and 1638), leading Chamorro families also hosted, succored and repatriated scores of castaways, receiving Spanish iron as compensation for their services.

This interaction over several generations created a 'culture of culture contact' and generated positive images of the islanders among Spanish officials. Despite a number of violent episodes associated with the shipwreck encounters, the Chamorros became better known among galleon officers and crews for their kind treatment and safe repatriation of stranded mariners and religious sojourners. 31

Because most of the Spanish ships reprovisioning off Guam and Rota also carried missionaries on their way to the Philippines, the Chamorros became unwitting candidates for Christian conversion, eventually leading to the first Spanish colony on Guam — the 1668 Jesuit Mission. This theocratic enterprise, welcomed largely because of its close association with the galleon trade, employed many of the tactics rooted in Philip II's "reformed" imperial policy, which was then being used in colonizing practices in the New World and the Philippines. The missionaries followed a strict non-violent, non-coercive approach to gain a diplomatic entrée and establish a settlement near — and allied with — a high-ranking village (Hagatna) on land provided by a paramount chief. 32

The liberal use of gift exchange, trading and first access to the mission's socio-political prestige, material and spiritual benefits engendered friendships and working relationships, cultivating Chamorro allies among elite chiefs and leading kin groups. The introduction of European plants, livestock, tools and clothing, aimed at improving the material well-being of the islanders, promoted and strengthened these alliances. The minimalist use of weapons in defense of the colony also contributed to the mission's early acceptance. As the mission's social transformation and political consolidation agenda grew intrusive, opposition

developed among some individuals, kin groups and villages. However, the missionaries resisted the temptation to arms, redoubling proselytization and defending themselves against sieges by converting their residence into a defensive stronghold and using their weapons primarily in self-defense, foregoing retaliation and retribution. 33

But as Spanish colonial policy had anticipated, many islanders steadfastly rejected conversion to the presumptive "true faith" and refused to accept so-called "superior" Spanish political and social institutions. Their opposition was also accompanied by the injury and death of Spanish priests, including the mission's founder. Then the call for "Christian arms" rang out and Spain's imperial agents, including a governor, military officers and garrison of soldiers, carried out "just war, pacification and reduction" to force Chamorro political submission to the Crown.

End Notes

1- Las Casa has become known in some scholarly circles as the "Father of Liberation Theology" for his advocacy on behalf of Amerindians, primarily his role in the Valladolid Debates. But he is regarded by other scholars as uncompromising and conflicted, because his ideas were from the Spanish colonists' and Crown's points of view impractical and incapable of changing an historic *fait accompli* and contradictory, as he advocated importing African slaves into the New World to relieve Amerindians from serfdom. See Christopher Minster, "Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484-1566)." *About.com Guide*. Another view is David Orique, O.P., "Bartolomé de las Casas: A Brief Outline of His Life and Labor." *The Man, The Issues*. Also, Adolph Francis Bandelier, "Bartolomé de Las Casas." *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. Vol. 3. New York: Robert Appleton Company.

2- In practice, *repartimiento* usually meant the distribution of indigenous people for forced labor. But in a larger sense, it also referred to the official distribution of goods, land, property and services. Typically, Spanish conquistadors and other important colonists-settlers were allotted tracts of native land, including the people living on them. Such allotments were known as *encomiendas* and the process, *repartimiento.* The terms were used interchangeably because the *encomienda* was typically accompanied by a system of forced labor and other assessments on the indigenous people. See *Historical Text Archive - Repartimiento*.

3- *De Indis et De Ivre Belli Relectiones, being parts of Relectiones Theologicae XII* by Franciscus de Victoria, primary professor of sacred theology in the University of Salamanca. Edited by Ernest Nys, Professor of International Law, University of Brussels. Introduction by Ernest Nys and translation by John Pawley Bate. Oceana Publications Inc., pp. 36-50. Also "Victoria, Franciscus de (1480-1546)." American Eras. 1997. *Encyclopedia.com*. 8 Mar. 2012.

4- Ibid. Also Margaret Kohn, "Colonialism" in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011)* Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

5- *Modern History Sourcebook*: "The New Laws of the Indies, 1542" and *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Law of the Indies. The 1573 *Royal Orders Regarding the Discovery, Settlement and Pacification of the Indies* is in Rodrique Levesque, *History of Micronesia: A Collection of Source Documents*. Vol. 2: Prelude to Conquest. (Quebec: Levesque Publications, 1992), pp. 451-458. The orders detailed the procedures in undertaking new conquests, which guided Spanish colonization policy until the 19th century.

6- Urdaneta and Legaspi's "new policy" order to crewmen and officers is in Levesque, *Source Documents*, II: 156-7 and 273-280. Also see John Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Arms and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959, pp. 7-10. And Linda A. Newson, *Conquest and Pestilence in the Early Spanish Philippines*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009: 5-7.

7- Urdaneta's proposal for a permanent settlement on Guam can be found in Levesque, *Source Documents,* II, p. 162. Also in Martin J. Noone , *S.S.C. General History of the Philippines: The Discovery and Conquest of the Philippines (1521-1581),* Part 1, Vol. 1. Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1986, pp. 279, 283-284 and 298.

8- Ibid.

9- Ibid.

10- Noone, *General History*, pp 290, 293 -294..

11- Noone, *General History*, pp. 278-282

12- The text of the Treaty of Zaragosa is in Levesque, *Source Documents*, I: pp. 529-539. Also see Noone, *General History*, pp. 269-270 and 284 for Urdaneta's concerns.

13- Noone, *General History*, pp. 268-270 and 283-285 and 290.

14- For Philip II's directive to Viceroy Velasco, Sept. 24, 1559, *see* Noone, *General History*, 265 and 284-287.

15- Noone, *General History*, pp. 295-296.

16- Legaspi's instructions from the *Audencia* of New Spain are summarized in Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803.* 55 Volumes. Vol. 2:89-100 and Vol. 34: 252; Also in Levesque, *Source Documents,* II, pp. 49-70. And Noone, *General History,* pp. 279, 283-284 and 298.

17- Frank Quimby, "The *Hierro* Commerce: Culture Contact, Appropriation and Colonial Entanglement in the Marianas, 1521-1668." *Journal of Pacific History,* Vol. 46, No. 1 (June, 2011), pp. 6-9.

18- Ibid.

19- Ibid, p. 8. Also Levesque, *Source Documents*, II: 93 for quote and 163, 279-280.

20- Quimby, *Hierro Commerce,* p. 9 and Levesque, *Source Documents*, II: 161.

21- Noone, *General History*, pp. 299-376.

22- For quote of Philip II's directions to Velasco, see Noone, *General History,* 286. For Legaspi's petitions to the King see Blair and Robinson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803,* Vol. 2:157-160. Melchor Legaspi's 1568-1569 Madrid petitions to the King on behalf of his father are also in Levesque, *Source Documents*, II: 394-397

23- Legaspi's petitions to the King for Guam and Rota are in Levesque, *Source Documents*, II, pp. 394-397.

24- *Conquistas de las Islas Filipinas, 1565-1615.* Gaspar de San Agustín; introducción por Pedro G. Galende; traduccion por Luis Antonio Mañeru/ Conquest of the Philippine Islands, 1565-1615. Gaspar de San Agustín; introduction by Pedro G. Galende; translation by Luis Antonio Mañeru. Manila, Philippines: San Agustin Museum, 1998. Vol. 1, Chapter 44, pp. 498-499. Noone, *General History*, pp. 377-378 and Levesque, *Source Documents*, II: 383-393. Also Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, 2: 239-243 and 3: 29-53 and 53: 381.

25- Noone, *General History*, pp. 376-378.

26- Blaire and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, Vol 2: 279. Also Noone, *General History*, pp. 376-379.

27- Noone, *General History*, pp. 377-378.

28- The royal instructions to Legaspi regarding the colonization of Guam and Rota are in Levesque, *Source Documents*, II: 406-409. For title of Governor of the islands for Legaspi, see Levesque, *Source Documents*, II: 401-404.

29- The royal appointment of Legaspi as *adelantado* of the islands is in Levesque, *Source Documents,* II: 405-406. The Crown granted a*delantados* to conquistadors in exchange for their funding and organizing the initial explorations, settlements and pacification of an area on behalf of the Crown. The title bestowed the right to become governors and justices of a specific region, usually a frontier area, generally placing the *adelantado* outside the jurisdiction of an *audiencia* or viceroy, and allowing the recipient to communicate directly with the Council of the Indies. See *Compilation of Colonial Spanish Terms*, and Lillian Estelle Fisher, *Viceregal Administration in the Spanish American Colonies,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1926, p. 81.

30- All subsequent quotes in this section regarding the King's grants, guidance and directions to Legaspi for the colonization of the Marianas are from *The Royal Instructions to Legaspi Regarding the Colonization of the Ladrone Islands* in Levesque, *Source Documents*, II: 406-409.

31- Quimby, *Hierro Commerce, 16-21.*

32- Marjorie Driver, "Cross, sword and silver: The nascent Spanish colony in the Mariana Islands," *Pacific Studies* 2:3 (1988) pp. 21-51. Also Francis X. Hezel and Marjorie Driver, "From conquest to colonization: Spain in the Mariana Islands 1690-1740", *Journal of Pacific History*, 23 (1988) 137-155.

33- Ibid.

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José de Quiroga y Losada: Conquest of the Marianas

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Abstract: *A well-born Spaniard, José de Quiroga y Losada, was a major figure in the subjugation of the Chamorro people, dedicated to their Christianization, killing many of them in the process.*

Introduction

The historical record of Jośe de Quiroga y Losada in the Mariana Islands begins with his arrival on Guam in 1679. Until almost his death in December 1720 on Guam, Quiroga functioned as the head of the *presidios* or Spanish military garrisons and their operations. Although he served as executive officer or governor of the Mariana Islands on three occasions in an acting capacity, he was never formally appointed as a Governor.

Quiroga first replaced Captain Juan Antonio Ruiz de Salas as governor. He was then replaced by Captain Antonio Saravia in June 1681 who was subsequently replaced by Sargento Mayor Damián de Esplana in November 1683. Esplana was replaced by Quiroga in November 1688. Quiroga was replaced again by Esplana in June 1690.

Commanding from a camp in Macheche, Quiroga and his troops went after resistant Chamorros and by 1680 the island had been divided into five districts (Hagåtña, Umatac, Agat, Inarajan, and Pago), each organized around a church-centered village or *pueblo* into which Chamorros were "reduced" or forced to live.

A year later Quiroga is described by Father Gerard Bouwens as having shown "great bravery" and having "made wonders" in his "conquest" of Rota, "climbing over steep mountains against a big number of barbarians who, astounded at his valor, had surrendered to him." (Father Bouwens would be appointed to lead the Saipan mission by Quiroga shortly before he and his soldiers engaged resistant Chamorros in a "final" battle on Aguijan in 1695. Bouwens would remain on Saipan until his death in 1712.)

Quiroga is perhaps best known (particularly during the periods in which he was not chief executive) for his tenacious pursuit and killing of Chamorro dissidents, the burning of their villages, his efforts in 1684 to quell resistance in the Mariana Islands (particularly on Saipan) and his belated return to Guam to stop a four-month long assault on the Spanish garrison in Hagåtña by Chamorros who had taken advantage of Quiroga's absence. Father Bouwens had considered the "wars" between the Spanish and the Chamorros to have concluded in 1676 until the 1684 coordinated rebellion began in Hagåtña.

From Galicia, Spain, Quiroga was the nephew of Cardinal Gaspar de Quiroga, Archbishop of Toledo, and second cousin to the Archbishop of Santiago, Chile and Mexico. He counted among his mentors Thysus González de Santalla, the Spanish theologian and 13th Superior General of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) and Maria de Guadalupe of Lencastre, 6th Duchess of Averio.

Quiroga originally signed "on as a sailor in order to get a passage" from Europe to Mexico. ("The Lord permitting it to be so, that I might earn much merit, if only I knew how to take advantage of it more. It seems to me that I have not known how.") Upon leaving his service in the Flanders war, where he served as a Lieutenant of Spanish Infantry, Quiroga criticized himself (in the self-effacing tone that characterizes his letters) for having squandered the "umpteen opportunities that the Lord has given me to serve Him...in order to concentrate better on the virtuous path and I see myself so much behind, I cannot write this without tears."

He had at one point expressed his desire to Jesuit Father Tirso Gonzales to "retire to serve God" whereupon Gonzales convinced Quiroga to "leave the world" and serve the missionary efforts in the Mariana Islands where he would have a substantial impact on the outcomes of Chamorro resistance against the Spanish. According to Father Bouwens, Quiroga led a pious, "exemplary life from the beginning...frequenting twice a week the sacraments of confession and communion...He would not knowingly commit a venial sin for all the lures of the world."

Upon reaching Mexico, Quiroga journeyed to Acapulco with a "troop of soldiers and sailors" where he ended up in a jail "where I deserved to be . . . right next to Don Francisco Valenzuela," the former Queen Mother's lover who was to be exiled to the Philippines.

Quiroga describes his eventual passage to the Marianas on a galleon as a "very good voyage" although upon arrival a strong wind ("currents [were] running away from the shore") prevented the ship from anchoring. The galleon tacked back and forth as supplies and men were unloaded. As Quiroga and two priests, Father Basilio Le Roux and Father Tomás Vallejo, lowered themselves into a Chamorro proa, Quiroga conjectured that God "may have wanted me to die at sea rather than ashore." A third priest, Father Maximilian Vanderstein, according to Father García Salgrado, "turned crazy during the second part of the voyage."

Quiroga was given a house second in quality only to the house of Captain Juan Antonio de Salas, the unofficial governor of the Marianas. Salas himself came under serious criticism in several Jesuit documents for acts that conveyed a negative image of the mission. These included his apparent approval of the taking of "poor precious things" from the dwellings of priests, his scandalous public cohabitations ("the Indians [Chamorros] take good notice of such things"), and his "bestial appetite" reflected in his raping of Chamorro girls who "came to hear catechism." "With such monsters," Father Emmanuel de Solózano wrote, "how can this Mission prosper?" Most references to Salas being replaced by Quiroga are consequently expressed in relief.

This first house on Guam appeared to also represent to Quiroga a spiritual message from God that his "will...be fulfilled" and Quiroga's own idea of his prowess: "I am very happy that it seems that the world treats me like ballast." Indeed, in a 1681 letter from Father Emmanuel de Solórzano (at one point director of the Colegio de San Juan de Latrán in Hagåtña) to Father Francisco García, Solórzano stressed that "the good gentleman" Quiroga, although endowed with "very good habits and known virtue," was nevertheless "hard of judgment and very self-conceited about himself and his things; he is always full of praises for himself and his nobility."

The honorary title of Governor for Quiroga appeared to have "gotten to his head" to such an extent that he fancied himself Governor of an area as vast as "either the Philippines or Flanders." It was in this perceptual context that Quiroga endeavored to make "a showing, having a retinue and command." Father Solórzano asserted that this confidence originated from Quiroga's conviction that not only was his own life "righteous" and faithful to God's commandments, he was also fulfilling the will of God. As such, he "thinks that whatever he does, discusses

and thinks, and is proposed as good to him, he must execute, because he cannot make a mistake by doing it."

Although Quiroga did not "consult with anyone," Solórzano continued, he was "a man of only average skill and without any experience with Indians [Chamorros]." And not only did Quiroga often meddle with the spiritual responsibilities and tasks of the Jesuits and did not accept spiritual counsel (which contrasts with Father Bouwens' assertion that Quiroga did seek such counsel), his many unspecified "material mistakes" caused "prejudice toward the Christian community and [are] damaging to us." Quiroga had been told on numerous occasion to consult "about things with those who know more," but he remained "judgmental and prone to being his own counsel [so that] he does not pay attention to any of it and runs over everything."

Quiroga also attempted to persuade Chamorros that "he can do everything here, that he is more than just a camp commandant and that they must first obey his commands before those of the Fathers." Solózano expressed concern that Quiroga's apparently undiplomatic demands that the Chamorros pay tribute "in the name of the King" for the "upkeep" of the soldiers and priests could lead the Chamorros to tighten those tributes to such an extent that the Chamorros could "starve us to death." But if this "young man" would only admit that he needed a guide and counselor, her "Excellency could not find a more fitting subject to govern the civilian side of these islands and to establish this Christian community."

Despite Solórzano's views of Quiroga's darker side, references to Quiroga in primarily Jesuit letters are peppered with accolades: "an angel," "a lad of much virtue with great health and good intention," a man "who gives a wonderful example to everyone," "famous," "a worthy Son of the Church," "a lion," "noble and Christian gentleman," "the Hernán Cortés of the Northern Marianas," "devoted and spirited soldier," "devout knight" (this from a May 1681 letter by Father Solórzano to Maria de Guadalupe, Duchess of Aveiro), "honorable and exemplary," and numerous other positive descriptors.

An anonymous Jesuit referred to Quiroga as this "angel" following his execution of two Spanish soldiers who were possibly facing charges of sodomy;his execution of *Matå'pang* who had killed Father Diego Luís de San Vitores eight years earlier ; and his applying the "choking collar to fifteen other evil-doers." (Another Jesuit letter, however, said that Chamorros on Rota turned *Matå'pang* over because of their

"fear" of Quiroga). Quiroga was also sometimes referred to as "the Hermit" by Jesuits for his apparent lack of interest in women.

Not uncommon also in letters of the time were deriding characterizations of Chamorros, particularly as "barbarians" along with frequent references to their lack of Western clothing. Quiroga himself labeled Chamorros as "new naked brothers" and as "donkeys" when Jesuits endeavored to convert them.

Chamorros who eventually cooperated and supported the mission, however, were simply referred to as "natives" or as "native allies." Chamorros are also referred to as *indos* in Spanish documents. Although this distinction between Christianized and yet-to-be Christianized Chamorros is often present in these documents. Christianized Chamorros were also sometimes referred to as "Marianos."

Chamorro beliefs in ancestral presences and powers were inevitably assaulted, often physically, in Quiroga's presence. In Jesuit descriptions of sorties undertaken by Quiroga and his men in 1680, the practice of honoring the skulls of ancestors before a fishing expedition or for the occurrence of rain, for example, was belittled and the Spanish often then destroyed the skulls.

In a simultaneously self-effacing and somewhat incoherent letter to the Duchess of Aveiro, a patroness of Jesuit missions, Quiroga describes the presence of a coarse stone on top of a venerated skull for the purpose of praying for "water, and wind, and other things." The village where this arrangement was found was apparently in southern Guam. Quiroga and others spat on the stone to challenge a belief that anyone who did so "would become crazy." Besides destroying skulls, Quiroga and his men also destroyed spears "the worst weapons in the whole world" and fashioned from human bone whenever they could because "there is nothing that can be done against their poison."

Quiroga described the conversion efforts of several priests, including those of Father Lorenzo Bustillo, who Quiroga maintained was so fluent in the Chamorro language that "he can almost teach it to the natives themselves."

Quiroga continued to deride Chamorros in his letter to the Duchess, forecasting that before Guam became "as it should be," considerable labor and blood would need to be spent, given "these barbarian people [who are] Godless, lawless and almost devoid of reason." He prayed for the creation of cotton crops so as to

"relieve this so great nakedness" but then ridiculed the efforts of some Chamorros to put on clothes given to them.

His summary of the earliest military expeditions on Guam is valuable not only for the military techniques detailed and reported Chamorro responses, but also for the description of life in the Marianas as the Spanish saw it. These expeditions were carried out four years before the concentrated suppression of Chamorros in the Northern Mariana Islands and his return to Guam to turn back the Chamorro attack on the Hagåtña garrison. Quiroga and Captain Antonio Saravia, governor of Guam from June 1681 to November 1683, had originally attempted to attack Saipan in 1683. Their boats were separated in a storm however whereupon Quiroga spent two days and nights at sea searching for Saravia until he was driven to Rota. Quiroga's bravery was extolled by Saravia, who had also managed to eventually reach Rota.

In early 1684, Quiroga routinely claimed that most Chamorros in Guam villages ran into the jungle upon the approach of his soldiers, while Christianized Chamorros typically approached them singing Christian hymns. After "prayers were sung" in one such village, Quiroga wrote that these Chamorros "then...performed their dance, and comedy, as although they are barbarians, they too have their own forms of entertainment."

In the village of Tarague, Quiroga described the almost simultaneous ministering by priests while soldiers chased down "evil-doers," perhaps killing them, certainly burning their homes. The visit was typically summarized in missionary triumph before the men moved on to another village and experienced similar events.

Quiroga's observation of Chamorro life, beliefs, and practices are sometimes relatively unique. Besides his observation of the course stone placed on a venerated skull, he noted that the women of Tarague, who besides being "all in complete nudity...adorned with the formal dress of our mother Eve" wore numerous flowers and beat their legs below their knees to create welts. "This way," he wrote, "they decorate their legs in lieu of the most formal set of clothes." Quiroga also claimed that both men and women "fashion many scars on their bodies, which they make by biting one another...there is no part of the body that is spared."

In his May 1684 letter from Saipan to Father Libertus de Pape, Father Peter Coomans (who was stoned to death on Saipan in July 1685) detailed the invasion of Saipan led by Quiroga in a "European-type boat...accompanied by not more than 20 native canoes [several others joined from Aguijan] with 60 select soldiers (Bouwens put the number at 76) and leader F. Mateo Cuculino, and everything needed for war." They had had to wait on Rota for two and a half weeks before favorable winds enabled them to reach Aquijan after sunset and according to Coomans, without the notice of Chamorros on either Aguiujan or Saipan.

Coomans depicted the initial encounters at Saipan with Quiroga leaping into the water just before reaching land, his soldiers behind him. Some Chamorros took "to flight" and others who challenged the landing party were wounded, a few killed. Thus "the terrified barbarians lost spirit." Although these resistant villages were razed, Coomans not infrequently referred to several villages successfully requesting peace. Those that did not "were laid waste with iron and fire...One person out of the crowd who dared to resist was cut down with an axe and his body hung by the foot from a tree to inspire fear."

Coomans described traps with "bone spear points and fire-hardened wooden stakes" that "native allies" guided Quiroga and his men around but not before two soldiers had fallen into a pit and were wounded. As Chamorros from this village fought, they set fire to their own houses when they eventually "took to flight." Quiroga and his troops undertook a number of sorties, bringing back at one point the head of the chief of the village of Agingan "as a trophy" whose "hand had been cut off when captured at sea by our men on another expedition." Coomans describes another "war chief" "Punni" of the village of "Tumhum" as "a brave man who met death boldly hurling his last spear at us."

Within two weeks of their arrival at Saipan, the Spanish constructed a garrison and mounted an expedition to the east, led by Quiroga, that apparently met no resistance. Efforts were subsequently made to salvage 20 culverin and 14 swivel guns offshore from the 1638 *Concepción* wreckage while "experiencing nothing hostile except some spears thrown from the woods." A few weeks after the Hagåtña siege began (but before he knew of it), Quiroga sent 17 soldiers to Guam on two boats with ten cannons from the *Concepción*. All were killed by Chamorros on Tinian after a storm forced them to divert there.

According to Father Bouwens' annual report for 1684-1685, however, Quiroga, "the Hernán Cortés of the Northern Marianas," had to undertake a series of offensive sorties to meet repeated attempts by Chamorros ("who were," Bouwens wrote, "gigantic in body but cowardly in heart and spirit") to overrun the Saipan garrison. Frequently describing Chamorro warriors as being amazed at the "valor" of Quiroga and his small number of soldiers and thus temporarily driven to retreat, Bouwens also recounted Quiroga's orderly retreat back to the garrison on several occasions where he exhorted his men to trust in God and revenge an imagined annihilation of the Hagåtña garrison. ("There is nothing in this life that I am afraid of," Bouwens quotes Quiroga as saying, "except the offense to God, not death.")

During one sortie, Quiroga and fifteen men sent Chamorros "squalling to the woods...with such a great push that the insurgents withdrew toward the mountains so aghast and in terror that they did so in a disorderly fashion." This trust in God was evident, according to Bouwens, by the fact that Quiroga and his men saw "spears break up in mid-air as they fell down at their feet." Bouwens took pains to stress that Quiroga spared ("moved to compassion") wounded Chamorros who he thought could be Christianized. Nevertheless, he ordered the burning of their canoes and grain fields and looting of "provisions enough for two years" which were brought back to the garrison.

In attacking the Hagåtña garrison on 23 July 1684, Chamorro warriors on Guam had taken advantage of the absence of at least half of the Spanish soldiers normally stationed on the island, who were campaigning in the northern Mariana Islands. Led by "Antonio" Yura (or Yula) from the village of Apotguan in Hagåtña, the warriors managed to conceal themselves among other parishioners at mass on the same day that Father Bouwens invited several priests for a meeting at his house.

Following the mass, the warriors broke into two groups, one sent to assassinate the governor and the others to attack the priests. Governor Damian de Esplana was severely wounded but survived. Several priests were also wounded and two were killed, including Mission Superior Father Emmanuel de Solórzano. Yura was killed by Spanish soldiers during the attack on Governor Esplana. It is certainly possible that if left to their own defenses, the Spanish garrison would have fallen to Yura's forces, leading most probably to the Chamorro overthrow of the Spanish government.

However, Hineti (Don Ignacio de Hineti in Spanish records), a clan leader from Sinajana,who was probably motivated in part by opportunities to advance from his *manachang* lower class status proved to be a critical linchpin in the ultimately successful defense of the Spanish garrison. During the attack, Hineti helped wounded priests into the relative safety of the garrison before gathering 50 warriors "armed with lances" who encircled the church and the priests' residence. He also carried two devotional statues from a burning building and gathered other "holy statues, ornaments, and jewels" during the next few days. In order to thwart a concerted attack by Yura's men that extended from July 27 until August 18, Chamorros from the village of Anigua joined Hineti and other Chamorro allies of the Spanish during the four-month defense of the garrison.

Several attempts were made to reach Quiroga who was unaware of the Hagåtña attack as he pursued the pacification of the northern Mariana Islands. These included Father Theofile de Angelis' attempt to sail to Rota and then to Saipan. He was killed before he could embark. This prompted warriors from Ritidian village to sail to Saipan to try to convince Chamorros there to kill Augustin de Strobach and Carlos Boranga. Governor Esplana also directed the "Fiscal of Asan" to sail to Saipan without stopping at either Rota or Tinian to deliver a letter to Quiroga reporting the Hagåtña attack. Father Bouwens also sent a Chamorro to Saipan the next day with instructions for Fathers Strobach and Boranga to return to Guam.

When they reached Guam, Strobach and his Chamorro escort turned back after they saw the smoldering ruins of the Colegio de San Juan de Letrán and the priests' residence. Chased at sea for a time by Apotguan warriors, the priest and his companion sailed to Rota where they found a stranded "Fiscal of Asan" who asserted that he could go no further. It wasn't clear if the "Fiscal of Asan" had been forced to remain on Rota by the Chamorros who brought him there. The question naturally arises as to why Quiroga didn't discover the Hagåtña uprising from the Chamorro who apparently reached Saipan to bring Strobach and Boranga back to Guam.

Bouwen wrote of the arrival on Guam of a "friendly" Chamorro from Rota who told them that Strobach had successfully reached Saipan and informed Quiroga of the Guam attacks. Strobach, however, was killed on Tinian. Boranga despite Bouwens' earlier statement that Boranga had decided to stay on Saipan was killed on Rota. Hineti's men were "useless" in terms of sending some of them to Saipan, since they were "reared in the mountains and therefore not accustomed to sail

[and] had no knowledge of seamanship." Nevertheless, rumors of the decimation of the Hagåtña garrison somehow reached Quiroga as did the rumor of Quiroga's demise reach Hagåtña . These rumors were most likely instigated by Chamorros on both islands, endeavoring to end the Spanish presence.

Apparently believing that his Hagåtña colleagues had been killed and the garrison overrun by Chamorro warriors, Quiroga "encouraged his soldiers with greater vigor that with the sword they might avenge so many sacrileges" and led them to southern Saipan where allegedly "the enemy despairing to resist him withdrew from the island toward the neighboring island." Then moving north, Quiroga and his soldiers slew "many rebels" and captured and wounded many others.

During an apparent lull in his Saipan campaign, Quiroga executed a disobedient Spanish soldier, imploring his troops not to offend either God's or the military's laws. The man was executed by firing squad to the amazement of Saipan Chamorros. Quiroga then had a Chamorro woman, who had brought gifts for his soldiers seized as a hostage to force someone from her village to voyage to Guam and bring back news. Upon reaching her village with Quiroga and his force, the woman cried out, leading Quiroga to cause "havoc among the Indians" killing more than 200 men, many apparently while they slept (men, "who not withstanding the vociferation of his guide, did not wake up").

Quiroga threatened to kill five members of a chief's family as well as to "annihilate" all the Chamorros of Saipan, if the chief failed to deliver the commander's letter to Guam or if he returned without an answer. Quiroga finally learned of the four-month siege of the Hagåtña garrison when the voyager (it is not clear if it was the chief or someone he commanded to go) went to a Christian Chamorro friend on Guam.

This "good Indian" from Saipan invoked "the Holy Eucharist which was the password" at the Hagåtña garrison and carried Quiroga's letter in to Sargento Mayor Damián de Esplana, who gave orders for Quiroga to return immediately to Guam. Meanwhile "rebel" canoes from Saipan had also reached Guam with an apparent Chamorro spy for the Spanish letting the garrison defenders know that Quiroga was about to return to Guam, and thus, according to Bouwens, "restore once again the lost Christian religion."

Upon the return of the "good Indian" Quiroga gathered his troops on Saipan and took to sea in the middle of the night with 35 men in eight canoes using the pretense of punishing Chamorros on nearby islands and under the distracting cover of small gun fire in the mountains. Three canoes with 15 men became caught in strong currents and were left behind (they eventually reached Tinian). The other canoes arrived at Guam after two days and nights at sea, reaching Hagåtña at about 3 a.m. on 23 November 1684.

This force allegedly struck "such terror and consternation upon the spirits of the natives" that many sailed to Rota and Tinian ("all feared their total ruin and extermination") while Quiroga made numerous sorties out of the garrison, ordering the "burning of the towns of the rebels" and killing "many Indians." Father Lorenzo Bustillo claimed in November 1688 that "two-thirds of the people of this Island of Guan [went] to the other island" following Quiroga's return from Saipan.

Bouwens, however, wrote in reference only to Christianized Chamorros that they "are endorsed (or endowed?) with many excellent qualities ["above all a charitable and obliging people"] rarely seen in the rest of the barbarian groups of America and the Orient." Bouwens concluded that since the 1684 "rebellion" had been defeated, Guam could once again become a "very flourishing Christian community" if the Chamorros were "educated and subjected under arms" albeit only if soldiers on the island become better trained "in the use of arms."

Mutiny

The historical record on Quiroga is relatively quiet for the next few years until 1688 when soldiers mutinied against Quiroga. The uprising was led by Manuel Salgado and apparently fueled by Quiroga's arrogance and the severity of his command over them, including during their off-work hours. Contributing to the general disenchantment was the general lack of "succor" (a frequent word of desire in Jesuit letters of the time) for soldiers. Soldiers placed him in shackles from May 27 to August 20, when he was freed by an illiterate Captain, Nicolás Rodriquez, who had turned against his fellow conspirators.

A year after the mutiny, Father Diego de Zarzosa, in a letter to Father Antonio Mateo Xaramillo (a Jesuit priest in the Marianas from 1678 to 1694), conjectured that its origins lay in Quiroga's continuation of Captain Damián de Esplana's practice of forcing soldiers to cultivate plantations and tend to pigpens from dawn

to dusk because "he did not have enough Indians to do the many chores of his invention."

Although Quiroga apparently expressed abhorrence for Esplana's actions, once Esplana had travelled to Manila (where he would be accused of deserting his post), Quiroga simply continued this forced labor. The soldiers were made to "work with greater rigor...without giving them time to breathe or take a little rest...they would prefer to be in the Moorish dungeons of the Barbary Coast than in the Mariana Islands," Zarzosa wrote. "This was the origin of an outcry calling for the death of the Governor until at last they became desperate."

According to Father Bustillo, Captain Rodriquez, who had participated in the "conquest" of Saipan, was "very calmly and was loved by all." He was apparently one of the few soldiers who did not detest Quiroga and his "annoying manner," demonstrating a "love so close that he did his best always to serve" Quiroga. On one or two occasions, Rodriquez had actually stopped soldiers from simply shooting Quiroga. There had also been a rumor that attempts were being made to poison Quiroga through his food.

Other factors that may have contributed to Quiroga's seizure included an unspecified "weakness" of Rodriquez that Quiroga discovered (possibly the discovery of Rodriquez having sex with his fiancée in the barracks), the lack of "succor" that had become too much for the soldiers, and the ability of some soldiers to allegedly turn Rodriquez against Quiroga.

Although Quiroga had sought the protection of the Jesuits (all of whom also fundamentally detested him "the priests of Christ are not his slaves"), Salgado led soldiers into the church on Ascension Day, seized Quiroga and took him to the fort in Hagåtña. Quiroga was subdued "with a pair of shackles; his house was sacked, and his clothes distributed among them, with Salgado getting the best ones." To the "disgust" of Rodriquez, the soldiers put on Quiroga's clothes to attend mass and then destroyed Quiroga's house.

This appeared to be the action that won Rodriquez back over to the Jesuits with whom he could then only occasionally speak, given Salgado's vigilant monitoring of Rodriquez. The Jesuits assured Rodriquez that not only would he receive a full pardon but that actions against the mutineers would earn him "great honor and advantage." At some point during the mutinous siege, Rodriquez managed to throw

"himself at the feet" of a shackled Quiroga who also promised Rodriquez a pardon and the retaining of his Captain's rank. Ironically, Salgado also aspired to establish himself as the absolute head of the Marianas government, "treating everyone with harsh words, and deeds" and subsequently earning the "insolences" of most soldiers.

Soldiers were also based in Umatac in anticipation of the arrival of a sloop from Manila that might threaten to upend the mutiny. Under the guise of cooperating with Salgado, Rodriquez traveled to Umatac with fifty soldiers and Father Miguel de Aparicio to whom he secretly pledged his support for Quiroga. After establishing himself within the defensive Umatac encampment, Rodriquez went back to Hagåtña, unshackled Quiroga (prompting a "firing salute" in tribute to his freedom) and then quickly returned to Umatac where he ordered the arrest and shackling of Salgado by soldiers who had tired of him just as they had tired of Quiroga.

Discovering shortly afterwards that a Sergeant and a Squad Corporal intended to put Quiroga back into irons, Rodriquez rushed back to Hagåtña ("he would fly along these roads leading from Umatag to Agadña on foot and under continuous rains"), arrested the two officers and ordered Salgado brought back to Hagåtña where all three "repentant" rebels were executed by harquebus a day before the sloop's arrival. Fourteen other soldiers were chained and made ready to ship off to a Manila galley.

Father Zarzosa believed that Quiroga's dominating and grating personality returned as soon as he was unshackled. If anything, Zarzosa contended, Quiroga became more stubborn as a consequence of his three months' imprisonment. The mutiny had left him "somewhat alienated, and outside of himself, although very cold, and alert to anything that might lead to vanity, and self-esteem." He began to ride his horse with five soldiers marching in front and others following behind to "make the Indians understand that he is the greatest Magarrahi *(Magala'hi)* [paramount chief] in the whole island."

Zarzosa attributed some of this vanity ("vanity in a man who prides himself in being virtuous, and God-fearing") to Quiroga's attempt to divert the "melancholy" that he struggled with after his release, despite his contention that he "would bury the matter in perpetual oblivion." Trusting only Sergeant-Major Juan de Medrano and Rodriquez, Quiroga otherwise "fears everyone, suspects everyone, checks

everything." Major Juan de Medrano, who arrived from Manila to assist Quiroga, also soon realized his mistake when Quiroga quickly came to resent the esteem soldiers felt for the new Sergeant-Major. Medrano subsequently regretted ever having come to Guam.

Attempted to monopolize food supply

Zarzosa also maintained that Quiroga attempted to monopolize the food supply on Guam so that priests would have to come begging him for food. Christianized Chamorros were afraid to approach priests, even with bananas, out of fear of retribution by Quiroga. Despite attempts by priests to talk to Quiroga about his "obstinacy" and "haughtiness," he would metaphorically "pull the bed covers over his head" and attribute these apprehensions to the Jesuits' imaginations. He subsequently granted himself the title of Governor and Captain General of the Marianas and made a Quiroga seal of arms composed of three lizards that he stamped upon official orders.

While Jesuits greatly desired that Quiroga would retire and find "some [other] place where he could quietly serve God," Quiroga himself worried that the Christian community might again be subjected to the consequences of another and possibly final mutiny against him. However, resigning was the furthest thing from his mind. Jesuits threatened to leave the Marianas mission and go to Manila. Soldiers began to go the priests' house more often to ask for supplies ("if we do not willingly give it, they will steal it from us"). Quiroga himself would send aides to ask for things from the priests after he had carefully inspected the Jesuit store room.

Although Quiroga had served as godfather at Rodriquez's wedding and had a house built for Rodriquez in Tumon (Tomhom) where other married officers lived, the commander would turn on Rodriquez in apparent retribution for his initial involvement in the mutiny, despite the fact that Rodriquez had turned to the Jesuits and subdued the mutineers to achieve Quiroga's freedom. Father Bouwens maintained that Quiroga had already put Rodriquez on a retirement list and that his real purpose was to have Rodriquez take care of pigs and plantations in Tumon. Even the mere sight of Rodriquez would eventually make Quiroga's "blood boil," believing that Rodriquez's "repentance" for having taken part in the mutiny was not sincere.

Without warning and without the Jesuits' knowledge, Quiroga had two officers escort Rodriquez and his wife at midnight to a sloop that also contained the fourteen mutinous soldiers being exiled to Manila. Giving his wife instructions in Chamorro, Rodriquez feigned a desire to say goodbye to the priests and disappeared into the jungle, eventually making his way to Umatac and seeking protection from Father Basilio de Roux. Quiroga tracked down Rodriquez but Basilio put Quiroga under the threat of ex-communication if he pulled Rodriquez out of the church.

Quiroga argued that the letter of recommendation he had given Rodriquez to present to the Governor of the Philippines would protect him from the retribution of soldiers there, although the letter merely highlighted his pardon of Rodriquez with the hope that the Governor would approve it. Rodriquez would ultimately remain in Umatac with his wife and reputation, allowing the Jesuits to hope that he could easily replace Quiroga if such good fortune ever came to pass.

Quiroga would somehow continue to serve under five successive governors: José Madrazo (1696-1700), Francisco Medrano (1700-1704), Antonio de Villamor y Vadillo (1704-1706), Manuel Argüelles y Valdez (1706-1706), and the governor that Quiroga had the most conflicts with, Juan Antonio Pimentel (1709-1720). Like most other missionaries and probably many Spanish officials), Quiroga was dedicated to the Christianization of Chamorros and possessed of a fanaticism requiring conversion at any cost, including the destruction of resisting Chamorros themselves and depopulation of the archipelago. Even the epidemics of European diseases for which Chamorros had no immunity were for Quiroga a reflection of God's wrath against recalcitrant Chamorros ("the vengeance of God...decimated them by means of various epidemics").

Change of heart

It is, therefore, perhaps surprising that his last years on Guam reflect a concern with the welfare of the Chamorro people. Out of his distorted justification (or rationaliry) for the depopulation of the Chamorro people, there emerged a desire to protect Chamorros from the abuses of Governor Pimentel and his harsh field supervisors, the appointed *alcaldes*. This concern was based on the successful Christian conversion of Chamorros, though the question of the extent and form of the Chamorros' appropriation of Christianity is a subject for contemporary scholars.

To Quiroga's mind, after having become Christians, Chamorros were to automatically have the protection of the Church and the Spanish Crown. In a scathing May 1720 letter to King Phillip V, Quiroga outlined the "excessive maltreatment" Chamorros experienced under Pimentel's reign. Eleven years previously in November 1709, Pimentel had himself written to King Phillip V decrying Quiroga's alleged inability to govern or to establish and enforce military discipline. He suggested that Quiroga be given land in the Philippines where he could spend his retirement years and save the Marianas *presidio* the expense of his salary.

Quiroga believed that while there were 50,000 Chamorros on Guam alone at the commencement of the "Conquest" in 1668, only 4,000 were alive in 1720, living in "so much poverty and misfortune." Quiroga placed particular emphasis on the meager few leaves of low quality tobacco given to Chamorros in payment for undertaking the difficult harvesting of "capers" on cliffs and rocks. The harvest was sold at exorbitant prices in Manila, Acapulco or to passing galleons but all for satisfying the greed of governors (including those before Pimentel) and the *alcaldes*. Governor Pimentel, Quiroga emphasized in his letter, "ravage[s] them with unendurable labour...some fall ill and do not want to be cured, because they say they would rather die than live a life of endless drudgery." Quiroga estimated that the value of the tobacco leaves a Chamorro man would receive for his labor was "one twentieth of a silver real [34 *maraveís*], meaning that a man would have to labor for four to six months to afford enough of the "poorest grade fabric sold in the Governor's [monopolistic] store" with which to make himself a pair of pants.

These few leaves of inferior tobacco were also given to Chamorros for their woven mats, baskets, and sails that were highly valued in the Philippines as well as for overseeing government-based chicken farms and piggeries in one of five *partidos* or district to which Chamorros were forced to settle by Quiroga and his men beginning in 1680. Although Pimentel tried to convince the Chamorros that the chickens and pigs were "for the common good of the Infantry," Pimentel and probably other governors before him simply sold the meat to the same soldiers at high prices.

Quiroga stressed that it was therefore common that a poor soldier, even a sick one, would never eat meat unless it was given to him by the Jesuits. Pimentel would also charge exorbitant prices for the *aguardiente* or fermented tuba harvested from coconut trees by Chamorros. Even the private fields of the Chamorros were

exploited by the *alcaldes* ("partly because of their greed and partly because of their fear of the Governor"), skimming off significant portions of the profits earned by Chamorros who sold their crops to the *presidio* and who subsequently failed to take care of their land because of this exploitation.

Quiroga expressed very belated charitable leanings when he maintained that besides the Jesuits giving clothes to islanders "who serve the Governor so that they will not have to present themselves unclothed," he himself attempted to "meet the needs of these poor people, because it seems to me that I can find no better way to spend the salary Your Majesty allows me than to feed the hungry and clothe the naked."

Quiroga recommended that King Phillip send "Malavar [South Indian] slaves" from Manila to relieve the strain for Chamorros who, besides having responsibilities for the piggeries also hunted "wild bulls" in the jungle, made lime and charcoal and prepared fields to be farmed for the entire sake of the *presidio*.

Although he recommended that the number of soldiers in the presidio be reduced from the current 130 soldiers to 50 or 60, given the subjugated and Christianized nature of Chamorros, Quiroga also expounds upon the "misery" (which "is no less" than the Chamorros suffer) of the Spanish and Filipino soldiers, including their reduced salaries, their exploitation by Pimentel's exorbitant and monopolistic prices and the related unavailability of clothing. Most "walk without shoes, nearly naked." Pimentel's promotion of gambling also meant more soldiers taking out loans on their salaries at the Governor's store, including those who took out loans so as to avoid the Governor eliminating their position if they drew their full salaries on payday. "Several old men" who fought with Quiroga during the Conquest had already lost their positions because they had not gone into debt to the Governor's store.

Quiroga also bemoaned the spiritual state of the Marianas and particularly Guam, where the virtuous conduct of the Jesuits had been unable to overshadow the "bad example" of Filipino and Spanish solders the latter of whom originating from Mexico and were "scum." Quiroga was particularly concerned about their "licentiousness": "there is no woman, married or unmarried, whom they do not solicit and abuse." These soldiers frequently forced husbands to leave their homes so that they could have free reign with these women.

Not only did Pimentel know about this but the *Palacio* that he occupied had become known as the "Harem of the Great Turk." The *Palacio*'s "school for girls" was, according to Quiroga, an accumulation of concubines, most of whom were eventually married to soldiers, often unwillingly while they maintained their sexual services to Pimentel. If these married soldiers, who subsequently rose speedily through the ranks, tried to dislodge their wives from the Palacio, they fell "from rank more quickly than they rose."

Pimentel, Quiroga charged, also forbade priests from offering communion when he was in the church. Pimentel's confessions amounted to threats to cut out the tongues of others he suspected of telling the priests about his scandalous behavior. And although five Jesuits on a Manila bound galleon who were persuaded by Guam priests to disembark began a series of devotions to San Ignacio which Pimentel began to frequent, he resisted the "life changes" that began to appear in others and stopped attending.

It would not specifically be Pimentel's corruption that would lead to his downfall, but rather his accommodating approach to English Captain Woodes Rogers whose four ships anchored off Umatac in March 1710. Assessing Rogers' superior forces, Pimentel allowed Rogers to accumulate provisions at will while the Spanish and the English entertained each other until Rogers shoved off to Mindanao a few weeks later. Investigation into Pimentel's corruption by Manila officials would follow after his imprisonment. The investigation would do little to stop future governors from exploiting Chamorros and their own positions for profit.

In his Hagåtña "confession" on 7 December 1720, Pimentel maintained that Quiroga would not be able to take over the government in his usual acting capacity because of his poor health its cause unspecified. Records from the next governor, Luís Antonio Sánchez de Tagle (1720-1725), included a notice by Quiroga that because of his age and worsening health, he could not replace Pimentel even temporarily and that another interim governor should be found.

Joseph de Quiroga y Lozada apparently died shortly after in late December, 1720, leaving all of his possessions and whatever wealth he possessed to the Colegio de San Juan de Letrán seminary in Hagåtña for the Christian-based education of Chamorro boys.

Consequences

Quiroga was a major figure in the subjugation of the Chamorro people. The consequences of this subjugation was apparent in the centuries-long Spanish acculturation of Chamorros that, in itself, is a well-spring of speculation on indigenous appropriation in real-life terms. Quiroga's attitudes and perceptions were not particularly unique for those times. While the fanaticism he possessed is more mirrored in his forceful oppression of Chamorros, fanaticism was likely a near universal phenomenon grounded in a perceived need to Christianize natives for the sake of saving their souls from hell.

The arrival of epidemics for which Chamorros had no natural defenses probably led to more deaths than Quiroga's sorties, violent as they were. The epidemics were seen by Quiroga as punishment from Guam against unyielding Chamorros. This mission of conversion and submission to the Spanish crown as Quiroga saw it was so ingrained into the purpose of the day that the extensive depopulation Chamorros underwent after an established Spanish presence in the Marianas was largely seen as the consequence of resistance. The singular choice that one had to make between Jesus Christ and darkness was probably no starker to the Spanish of those times than when these deaths sometimes nearly swept up entire villages. There are practically no indications in historical records of Spanish attempts to altruistically respond to the epidemics.

So it was probably more outside this gestalt of purpose that Quiroga's arrogance, self-confidence and delusion of unquestionable purpose met with the frailties of other human beings possessed with the same fanaticism that eld to the conflicts that ensure between humans under difficult circumstances. Like Inspector Javert who mercilessly pursues the virtuous Jean Valjean in Victor Hugo's *Les Miserables* and who Hugo describes as being a "mixture of Roman, Spartan, monk and Corporal a physiognomist," Quiroga's well-known countenance and faults unknown to himself would have made him a marked man, a predictable man. And predictability as a consequence of all unquestioned beliefs would mean disaster to the indigenous people toward whom this intellectual lethargy was aimed.

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19th Century Society in Agaña: Don Francisco Tudela, 1805-1856, Sargento Mayor of the Mariana Islands' Garrison, 1841-1847, Retired on Guam, 1848-1856

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Abstract: *Don Francisco Tudela's record of service reveals his dedication in serving his country as a member of the Spanish Infantry, until his retirement, when he established residence in the Mariana Islands, and where he married in 1848. His nuptial file contains documents that reveal information concerning the people of Guam and to the extent that the Spanish legislation was applied in this distant colony. The requirements for a Spanish officer to marry generated lengthy bureaucratic paperwork that, today, is a source of rich information about life in Agaña and its principalía during the 19th century, in addition to the information found in the probate of Don Francisco Tudela's Last Will and Testament. This paper will present an historic account regarding the origin of the Tudela family in the Marianas, his wife Doña Josefa Anderson, and concludes with the marriage of their youngest daughter to the Spanish Governor Francisco Moscoso y Lara.*

Introduction

Don Francisco Tudela was born [1805?], in the city of Bocairente, province of Valencia, Spain. He began his military career in 1823, as a corporal in the artillery of Spain. In 1828, he departed for Manila, a trip that lasted from 3 June 1828 until 31 October 1828 (AGMS, Leg. T-1297:1). Assignments in the colonies were an incentive for military personnel to serve in Spain's Provinces of Ultramar (overseas), since the time spent on the voyage was compensated with the equivalent of one year of services that was added to the time for retirement (Royal Order of 24 November 1825). He served as Sergeant of the Artillery in Manila until 1834, and then was appointed Captain of the *Compañía de Dotación* in the Province of Calamines. Two and a half years later, in March 1837, he was promoted to *Sargento Mayor* [Commander in Chief of the Presidio] in Zamboanga, where he served as Commander for more than four years, and then was transferred to the Mariana Islands. On 9 December 1841, *Don* Francisco Tudela was appointed *Sargento Mayor* of the Mariana Islands. He arrived during the tenure of Governor Lt. Colonel José Casillas Salazar (1837-1843). The population of Guam and Rota in the year of his arrival was 7,751 (PNA, 9, Exp. 33:1-5). During the governorship of *Don* Gregorio

Santa María (1843-1848), *Don* Francisco Tudela, in addition to his duties of *Sargento Mayor* of the Presidio, also was appointed rector of the *Colegio San Juan de Letrán* until 9 February 1847, when he departed for Manila to request his retirement after twenty-five years and three months of service.

While he was serving in the Marianas, he was promoted to *Subteniente* (Second Lieutenant) of the Infantry by Queen of Spain Isabella II, retroactive to 2 July 1844. Upon the death of his first wife *Doña* María de Torres, he returned to Manila on 12 February 1847, where he was appointed by *Don* Narciso Clavería y Zaldúa, Governor and Captain General of the Philippines, *Subteniente* and Headquarters' Staff at Fort Santiago (Estado Mayor Real Fortaleza de Santiago) (AGMS, Leg. T-1297:3-4).

On 17 June 1848, while in Manila, he requested his retirement from the military service and asked permission to establish his residence in the Mariana Islands:

> [To] Estado Mayor (Headquarters) King's Tenancy of the *Plaza* of Manila [Colonel *Don* José Luis Bolaños] (Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho Universal de Guerra, 1848:181).
>
> [From] *Don* Francisco Tudela, 3rd Assistant of the Superior Command of this *Plaza* (Garrison) serving in the Marianas.
>
> The *Subteniente* of the Infantry in active duty, *Don* Francisco Tudela, 3rd Assistant of the Superior Command of this *Plaza* [Garrison] with an assignment to Fort Santiago, in addressing Your excellency the Governor and Captain General [Clavería], he is requesting his retirement to be granted in the Mariana Islands, where he had married, and, as a result of the death of his wife, he has real property and other interests that his mother-in-law administers. Consequently, the King's Tenancy has given him course with the following report and resolution.
>
> Inform: [To] the Most Excellent *Señor* Governor The *Subteniente* of the Infantry and 3rd Assistant of the Superior Command of this *Plaza* with an assignment to Fort Santiago, *Don* Francisco Tudela, explains to Your Excellency in the present instance that the climate of this capital [Manila] is not convenient to his health, but that of the Marianas is better for his health, where he married an *hija del país* (daughter of the country), and as a consequence he owns some real property with other interests, owing to the death of his wife, his mother-in-law administers his estate (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:7). Therefore, in order to administer his business and take

> care of his health, he requests that Your Excellency grant him retirement in another place [besides Manila], based on the twenty-four years of service.
>
> Evidence of this is in his record of service or credentials, on which I base my judgment, I recommend to Your Excellency to grant him retirement in the capital of the Mariana Islands. It is up to Your Excellency to resolve what is more just. Issued in Manila on 17 June 1848 and signed by the Most Excellent *Señor* Colonel *Don* Luis Bolaños.

On 4 July 1848, Queen Isabella II issued the decree granting retirement to *Don* Francisco Tudela approving his legal residence in the city of Agaña in the Mariana Islands with a pension of 30% of the salary of an active duty officer in his rank in the Peninsula or 140 *duros* a month, adjusted to inflation (AGMS, Leg. T-1297:5).

A memorandum issued on 14 July 1848, accompanying all records of service, was sent from Colonel *Don* Luis Bolaños, King's Tenancy of the *Plaza* of Manila to the *Gobernador Político Militar* (Civil and Military Governor) of the Mariana Islands *Don* Pablo Pérez (1848-1855), notifying him of *Don* Francisco Tudela's retirement, and establishing his legal residence in the city of Agaña, Mariana Islands (AGMS, Leg. T-1297:6).

Don Francisco Tudela returned to Agaña in mid-August 1848, as a retired officer and became a businessman in the civilian community. He met one of the daughters of the Scottish John [Juan] Anderson, who arrived on Guam in 1819. John Wilson, a physician, who visited the Marianas in 1840, stated "John Anderson was a Lieutenant in the English Navy. He was found guilty of a breach of trust and fled to the Marianas where he established his residence and married a local woman. He was a tall very stout man, fluent in Spanish, Chamorro, and French; he was the government pilot, interpreter, port-adjutant and he was responsible for other functions" (Wilson, 1991:90). Wilson added: "Mr. Anderson and his Chamorro wife had a large family of six boys and five girls" (Wilson 1991:111).

In order to marry his fiancée, *Don* Francisco Tudela had to comply with extensive bureaucratic paper work, which was a requirement for European-born Spanish officers by the *Monte Pío Militar* (Military Welfare), established in 1761. To marry, it was necessary to obtain a Royal license from the immediate superior authority prior to marrying in the church; otherwise the marriage was seeing as clandestine

(Vázquez Montón, 1997:88-90). The documentation contained in the nuptial file is translated from the Spanish language and presented in this paper.

Archivo General Militar, Segovia, AGMS T-1297
Nuptial File, 1849
TUDELA, FRANCISCO
Subteniente of the Infantry
3rd Assistant of the Superior Command of the *Plaza* of Manila
Wife *Doña* Josefa Engracia Anderson [cover page] (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:10).

Marriage License
[From] The Superior Government and Captaincy General of the Philippines
[To] Most Excellent *Señor*, War Department

The notarized copies included in this file addressed to your excellence (V.S.Y), constitute the proceedings originated by the *Subteniente* of the Infantry, retired abroad, in the Mariana Islands, *Don* Francisco Tudela.

He is requesting license to marry *Doña* Josefa Engracia Anderson. He has presented all documentation as prescribed in the rules of *Monte Pío Militar* [Military welfare] of 1 January 1761, royal decrees, and other requirements of current laws. Although there are a few requirements that cannot be fulfilled exactly, due to the circumstances of the islands, nevertheless, the Auditor of War had found it in conformity, and he has issued the corresponding marriage license. Consequently, it is forwarded and submitted to your Excellency (V. S.Y.) for Royal approval. God Bless Your Excellency (V.S.Y) Manila 26 January 1849. Narciso Claveria [signed].

[To] The Most Excellent *Señor*, Secretary of the Supreme Tribunal of War and Navy
Section of Government of *Monte Pío Militar* (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:11).

Year of 1849
Notarized Copies of the Proceedings from *Don* Francisco Tudela,
Retired *Subteniente* of the Infantry
Requesting License to Marry to *Doña* Josefa Engracia Anderson
Duplicate (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:12)

Documents Included in the Nuptial Proceedings

1. Decree of Retirement

Don Narciso Clavería and Zaldúa, Knight of the Great Cross of the royal orders of *Isabel la Católica and San Hermenegildo*, of that of San Fernando, the first and third class, decorated with diverse crosses of distinction for functions of war, Lieutenant General of the National Armies, Governor and Captain General of the Philippines, President of the Real *Audiencia*, Judge Sub- delegate of the Revenue of Post Office, and Diplomatic mail, Vice Patron and General Director of the troops, etc. In consideration of all reasons exhibited by the *Subteniente* of the Infantry, 3rd Assistant of the Superior Command of this *Plaza, Don* Francisco Tudela, and in consideration to what the King's Tenancy of the *Plaza* of Manila had manifested in these proceedings, I have decided by decree of this date to grant him retirement in the overseas provinces based on the consultation and assertion of the Royal Decree (AGMS, Leg.T1297:13). He had requested his retirement to the Mariana Islands, enjoying a pension equivalent to 30% of the regular salary of an active *Subteniente* in the Peninsula, adjusted to inflation, this in conformity with the Law of Retirement of 8 August 1841 as a result of his twenty years of service in the military, the corresponding payment is seven *pesos* ($7.00) monthly. Therefore, in order to fulfill all requirements, he will present this decree to the Quarter-Master General. Issued in Manila on 23 June 1848, and signed by Narciso Clavería; Secretary, Colonel José María Peñaranda. *[Note: the peso was equivalent to an ounce of gold (LCM, Item 53:36b)].*

Your Excellency grants retirement to the *Subteniente* of the Infantry, 3rd Assistant of the Superior Command of this *Plaza Don* Francisco Tudela, in the city of Agaña, Mariana Islands. Manila, 26 June 1848 (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:14). It has been ordered to present this decree to both accountancies. Signed, Belsa. It was presented to the accountancy of the Royal Tribunal and *Audiencia* of Manila on 28 June 1848, signed by Aragón and Orbeta. Also, it was presented to the accountancy of the Army Headquarters and Treasurer of Manila on 3 July 1848, signed by Baringa.

2. Decree of Retirement in Agaña

Government of the Marianas and Agaña, 8 September 1848. [Governor] Pérez ordered the Administrator of the Treasury to create an account to record the payments that are indicated in the given decree, signed by Pérez. It has been recorded in the Book of Government that exists in the archive of this Secretary of Government, which I administer, signed José de la Cruz, Secretary; date *ut supra*. It has been recorded in the Treasury of these islands, attested to in San Ignacio of Agaña, 10 September 1848, signed by Felix Calvo. It is a copy of its original,

presented by the interested party and, for the record, it is signed in Agaña on 2 October 1848, and signed by José de la Cruz, Secretary of Government and War and endorsed by Pérez (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:15).

3. Death Certificate of Doña María de Torres

Fray Vicente Acosta de la Santísima Trinidad, Parish Priest of the city of San Ygnacio of Agaña, in the Mariana Islands Certified that among the books that are in the custody of the archives of this Parish, there is one that began in the year eighteen-hundred and forty-three, 1843, and in its folio fifty-nine, 59, is a death registry, which, copied literally, is as follows: "On the twenty-third day of January of the year eighteen-hundred and forty-seven, I *Fray* Vicente Acosta de la Santísima Trinidad, Parish Priest of this city of Agaña, gave a Christian burial in the *Capilla de Nuestra Señora de los Dolores* (Chapel of Our Lady of Sorrows) to the body of *Doña* María de Torres, married to *Don* Francisco Tudela, both residents of this city, in which they received all Sacraments. It is an exact copy of its original that is in the folio and book cited." Signed by *Fray* Vicente Acosta de la Santísima Trinidad (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:16).

Verification: *Don* José de la Cruz, Secretary of Government and War of the Mariana Islands, where the Lieutenant Colonel, Second Commander of the Infantry *Don* Pablo Pérez is Governor Certify and attest that the Reverend Priest *Fray* Vicente Acosta de la Santísima Trinidad, who is given the previous certification, is the Parish Priest of the city of Agaña. He is a person of full credibility, keeping all legalities and formalities in his writings and certifications. His penmanship and signature are authentic, and for the record, I signed this in San Ignacio of Agaña on 1 October 1848, José de la Cruz, Secretary of Government and War, endorsed by [Governor] Pérez (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:17).

4. Baptismal Certificate of Josefa Engracia Anderson y de la Cruz

Fray Vicente Acosta de la Santísima Trinidad, Parish Priest of the city of San Ygnacio of Agaña, in the Mariana Islands Certify that among the books that are in the custody of the archives of this Parish, there is one that began in the year eighteen hundred twenty-seven, and in its folio forty-three, there is a baptismal registry, which copied literally is as follows: "On the fifteenth day of December of the year eighteen hundred twenty-eight, I Fray Mariano de la Misericordia de San Miguel, Missionary of Agaña and its vicinities, baptized in the Church of this city a girl two days old, who was born on the 14 of given month. I gave the name of Josefa Engracia, daughter of Juan Anderson and Josefa de la Cruz, his legitimate wife, both residents of Santa Cruz, Agaña (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:18). Her godmother was

Josefa Camacho, resident of Santa Cruz, and for the record, I signed it *Fray* Mariano de la Misericordia de San Miguel." It is in accordance with its original in the book and folio previously cited. Signed by *Fray* Vicente Acosta de la Santísima Trinidad.

Verification: *Don* José de la Cruz, Secretary of Government and War of the Mariana Islands, where the Lieutenant Colonel, Second Commander of the Infantry, *Don* Pablo Pérez is Governor Certify and attest that the Reverend Priest *Fray* Vicente Acosta de la Satísima Trinidad, who is given the previous certification is the Parish Priest of the city of Agana. He is a person of full credibility, keeping all legalities and formalities in his writings and certifications. His penmanship and signature are authentic, and for the record I signed this in San Ignacio of Agaña on 1 October 1848, José de la Cruz, Secretary of Government and War, endorsed by Pérez (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:19).

5. Don Juan Anderson Commissioned Second Lieutenant of the Maritime Militia, 1832

Lieutenant Colonel *Don* Francisco Villalobos, Graduated, Distinguished Knight by the august Queen, with the medal of honor of unblemished loyalty, decorated by the King our Lord (God Save the King) with the Army Distinguished Cross, Captain of *Plaza Mayor* of the Royal Artillery, Commander of Engineering and Marinas, Civil and Military Governor of the Mariana Islands. Whereas, in consideration of *Don* Juan Anderson's merits, who currently is the Port's Adjutant, I am appointing him Superintendent of the Maritime Battalion, a newly created Department in these islands. Therefore, I order all personnel subject to my jurisdiction, and those who are not, I ask you all to provide the Second Lieutenant of the Maritime Militia with all corresponding considerations given by law and to provide a good service to our King our Lord, (Good Save the King). Issued in San Ygnacio of Agaña, on 18 January 1832, and signed by Francisco Villalobos, Antonio Joaquín de León Guerrero, Secretary. This is an authentic copy of its original presented by the interested party. To attest, it is signed in Agaña on 2 October 1848 by José de la Cruz, Secretary of Government and War, endorsed by [Governor] Pérez. (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:20).

6. Don Juan Anderson Appointed Port's Adjutant, 1831

Government and Command of the Captaincy of the Port in the Marianas His Excellency Captain and Commanding General of the Maritime Department in this islands and the Philippine Archipelago in a Memorandum of 29 July 1830 (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:21), you authorized me among other things, to look for personnel to

staff the Maritime Department in the islands as it is ordered in Memorandum of 1 January of 1830, which directed the organization of the Captaincy of the Port. For this reason, I am appointing *Don* Juan Anderson, Port's Adjutant; therefore, he will act with full authority in the absence of the Port's Captain. I made the appointment following what is indicated in article 4, thus he is appointed and earning a salary of four *pesos* ($4.00). Your appointment has been approved and accordingly, Your Excellency is the Port's Adjutant of these islands. God save Your Excellency many years. San Ignacio of Agaña, capital of the Mariana Islands, 8 October 1831 (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:22). Signed *Don* Francisco Villalobos, Governor; *Don* Juan Anderson, Port Adjutant. This is a copy of its original that was presented by the interested party, and to attest, I sign it in Agaña, on 2 October 1848, José de la Cruz, Secretary of Government and War, endorsed by Pérez. *[Note: Governor Francisco Villalobos granted the title of Don to Juan Anderson].*

7. Marriage Certificate of Juan Anderson and Josefa de la Cruz
I, *Fray* Vicente Acosta de la Santísima Trinidad, Parish Priest of the city of San Ygnacio of Agaña in the Mariana Islands Certify that among the books that are in the custody of the archives of this Parish, there is one that began in the year seventeen-hundred and ninety-two, and in its folio one-hundred fifty-nine, there is a registry, which copied literally read as follows: "On 21 November 1819 (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:23), I father *Don* Ciriaco del Espíritu Santo, Priest of these islands, proclaimed the marriage banns and finding no opposition or impediment, I personally authorized and performed the marriage of Juan Anderson, born in the city of Edinburgh, Scotland, and Josefa de la Cruz born in this city of Agaña. They both declared mutual consent by words stated in my presence. The witnesses, *padrino* (best man) was Cadet Manuel Torres and *madrina* (maid of honor) Andrea Palomo, both residents of this city. I gave them the nuptial blessing, and attesting this, I signed Ciriaco del Espíritu Santo." It is in accordance with its original in the book and folio previously cited. Signed by *Fray* Vicente Acosta de la Santísima Trinidad (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:24).

Verification: *Don* José de la Cruz, Secretary of Government and War of the Mariana Islands, where the Lieutenant Colonel, Second Commander of the Infantry *Don* Pablo Pérez is Governor Certify and attest that the Reverend Priest *Fray* Vicente Acosta de la Santísima Trinidad, who is given the previous certification is the Parish Priest of the city of Agaña, he is a person of full credibility, keeping all legalities and formalities in his writings and certifications. His penmanship and signature are

authentic, and for the record, I signed this in San Ignacio of Agaña on 1 October 1848, José de la Cruz, Secretary of Government and War, endorsed by Pérez.

8. **Parents Nuptial Consent for Josefa Engracia**
[Note: The Spanish civil legislation of 1776 required that the son that has not reached the age of twenty-three years or the daughter that has not reached the age of twenty years, must have the written consent of the parents, grandparents, or guardians in order to marry. This formality is found in this document].

> "I, *Don* Juan Anderson and *Doña* Josefa de la Cruz, parents of Josefa Engracia, grant permission to her, so she can freely marry *Don* Francisco Tudela, *Subteniente* of the Infantry who has retired in the Mariana Islands (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:25). To attest to this, we signed for the record in the presence of the Secretary of this Government, in San Ygnacio of Agana on 24 September 1848. Josefa de la Cruz, drew a cross, not knowing how to write, Juan Anderson's signature."

Verification: *Don* José de la Cruz, Secretary of Government and War of the Mariana Islands, where the Lieutenant Colonel, Second Commander of the Infantry *Don* Pablo Pérez is Governor Certify and attest that the cross and signature on the previous document are authentic, and that is how they customarily do business, and for the record, I signed this in San Ignacio of Agaña on 2 October 1848, José de la Cruz, Secretary of Government and War, endorsed by [Governor] Pérez.

9. Memorandum to the Governor and Captain General Requesting Marriage License
From *Don* Francisco Tudela (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:26), *Subteniente* of the Infantry, retired in the Mariana Islands, to Your Excellency, with due attention, state that: I am a widower and evidence of this is shown in document number three that accompanies this application. I want to remarry, to my fiancée Josefa Engracia Anderson, single. See evidence by the certificate of baptism [document] number four, legitimate daughter of *Don* Juan Anderson, Second Lieutenant of the Maritime Militia of the Mariana Islands and Port Adjutant of these islands, and *Doña* Josefa de la Cruz, according to [documents] number five, six and seven. Included also is the relevant parental consent [document] number eight, therefore, -To Your Excellency, I ask you to grant me license to marry Josefa Engracia Anderson, a grace expected from the goodness of Your Excellency (AGMS, Leg.T1297:27). Signed by *Don* Francisco Tudela, on 30 September 1848 in San Ygnacio of Agaña.

10. Memorandum from the Interior Auditor of War
To Claveria [Governor and Captain General of the Philippines]
Your Excellency The circumstances in which *Don* Francisco Tudela, *Subteniente*, who is retired in the Marianas, allow us to accept the accompanying documents as sufficient. The required solemnities can be excused since they cannot be met in those islands. The letter in which he sought permission from Your Excellency to marry Doña Josefa Engracia Anderson should suffice. The Judge Advocate General is of the opinion that Your Excellency can grant *Don* Francisco Tudela license to marry *Doña* Josefa Engracia Anderson. Binondo, 25 November 1848 (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:28).

Resolution: Manila 25 November 1848, in consideration of the circumstances of the retired *Subteniente*, *Don* Francisco Tudela, who lives in the Mariana Islands, and in conformity with the Judge Advocate General's opinion, manifested in the previous document, I proceed to grant him official license to marry *Doña* Josefa Engracia Anderson. Therefore, I order to issue the corresponding authorized duplicate copies of this proceeding, charging the expenses to the account of His Majesty and obtain Royal approval. Signed, Clavería. Met. Reyero (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:29).

This document is consistent with the original certificate that exists in the secretariat of the General Captaincy of which I refer, and in compliance with the previous decree or resolution, I ordered the Judge Advocate General's staff to make a copy of this document in nine folios, 26 January 1849. The witnesses that reviewed the accuracy of the data and content were *Don* José del Castillo, *Don* Rafael de los Angeles and Pablo de Santa Barbara, all present. To attest to this, I sign, Antonio María Regidor (AGMS, Leg.T-1297:30).

[Note: This marriage license issued by the Governor and Captain General of the Philippines, Don Narciso Clavería, also granted the honorific title of Doña to Josefa Engracia Anderson. Therefore, on that date Doña become part of her legal name].

The marriage of *Don* Francisco Tudela and *Doña* Josefa Anderson lasted until 30 May 1856 when the death of *Don* Francisco Tudela occurred. They have three children. The following is the translation of his Last Will and Testament.

U.S. Library of Congress
Mariana Islands, Item 53, (LCM 53:1-37a)
1856 Inventory and execution of the estate of

Don Francisco Tudela, *Subteniente*, Deceased
Civil and Military Government of the Marianas
Began on 30 May 1856
Copies of the Probate of
Second Lieutenant *Don* Francisco Tudela
Retired in these Islands
He died on 30 May the same year
No. 1 [53:1]

Memorandum to [*Don* Cecilio Camacho] Senior Assistant *Compañía de Dotación* of these Islands: Civil and Military Government of the Marianas Having died of natural death on this day, *Don* Francisco Tudela, *Subteniente* and Headquarters' Staff, retired, resident in the Mariana Islands. Your Excellency will go to the house of the deceased to take inventory of the goods and effects, according to the ordinance. God save Your Excellency many years, Agaña, May 30th of 1856. La Corte [Governor].

> I, *Don* Cecilio Camacho, Senior Assistant *Compañía de Dotación* of these Islands, in accordance with the preceding order from the Governor, *Don* Felipe de la Corte, I should name a notary as it is indicated in the ordinance, therefore, I name José Pérez, Second Sergeant of the Urban Militias and the Grenadiers Company, to exercise the functions of current notary, and to act in the diligence of the inventory that I am going to form of the [LCM 53:2] goods and effects of the deceased *Don* Francisco Tudela, *Subteniente* and Headquarters' Staff, retired, resident in the Mariana Islands. In having been notified of the obligation that he has contracted, he accepts, he swears, and he promises to do it with all legalities required. And to attest to this, he signed before me in Agaña on 30 May 1856. Cecilio Camacho. José Pérez.

Hereby, *Don* Cecilio Camacho, Senior Assistant *Compañía de Dotación* of these Islands to initiate this inventory, I command citation of the Very Reverend Father Aniceto Ibáñez, vicar and curate of this city, *Don* José de Torres, Lieutenant of the *Compañía de Dotación,* and *Don* José Aguilar, Second Assistant of the same. According to what is directed in His Majesty's Royal Ordinances, these witnesses are to be convened tomorrow at eight in the morning, in the room that served as home to the late *Don* Francisco Tudela. I had notified them as well as I notified the corresponding notary. And for the record, I attest to it and signed. Cecilio Camacho, [LCM 53:3a] José Pérez.

On 31 May 1856 in Agaña, the Senior Assistant of the *Compañía de Dotación* of these Islands, *Don* Cecilio Camacho went to the quarters that served as home to the late *Don* Francisco Tudela, who was Second Lieutenant and Headquarters' Staff, retired; and accompanied by my notary, appeared with the Very Reverend Father Aniceto Ibáñez, Vicar and Curate of this city, witnesses *Don* José de Torres and *Don* José Aguilar and the lady by the name *Doña* Josefa Anderson who was aware that the late *Don* Francisco Tudela had made a Last Will and Testament. I gave her notice of my orders to give us the Last Will in consignment, in accordance with His Majesty's Royal Ordinances, consequently, she gave us a sheet of paper written with his own handwriting on plain paper that was put in the hands of the parish priest and all those present have been aware of the contents of this [LCM 53:3b] Last Will that was made in the city of Agaña on the 20 April of 1856, which the letter reads as follows:

> In the name of Almighty God, amen. I, *Don* Francisco Tudela, Second Lieutenant, retired, and resident of the Mariana Islands, finding myself sick in bed and with sound mind, memory and natural understanding, believing and confessing, as I firmly believe and confess to the Highest the incomprehensible mystery of the Holy Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, three distinct persons and only one true God, and all other mysteries and sacraments that believe and confess our Holy Mother the Roman Catholic Church, whose true faith I profess and believe. I have lived and I live and die as a Catholic, a faithful Christian, fearful of death that is as natural and true to all [LCM 53:4a] human creatures, as it is uncertain of our time to be prevented by testamentary disposition. I hereby give, devise, bequeath, and order my Last Will as follows:
>
> First: I commend my soul to God, and once my death is verified, I direct that my body to be shrouded as usual, and buried in the common cemetery of the city or within the parish if it is admissible. It is my Last Will that my funeral be solemn.
>
> Second: I direct that a sung Mass and twenty-five ordinary Masses be celebrated for my soul, giving alms for each Mass, in the amount of what is usual and what has been established.
>
> Third: I declare to have no debts whatsoever to any person.

Fourth: I declare, that I am married to *Doña* Josefa Anderson, from whose marriage are three legitimate children and in attention to her good behavior and the maternal love that she professes to them, [LCM 53:4b] I nominate and appoint my wife to look with the greatest zeal and monitoring the conservation of their property.

Fifth: I direct that she will be the guardian and curator of our children, unless some day she might think to get married, because then, she will be relieved of the children's guardianship and conservatorship, passing it first to her father *Don* Juan [John] Anderson, and second to Sergeant Andrés Castro, who I direct to be appointed such guardians and curators of my three children, in the event of my wife's death or who, otherwise, may be replaced.

Sixth: I declare that the value of my capital is fourteen thousand *pesos* [$ 14,000.00], which I have earned from investing in goods and effects brought from Manila between last year and the present year. These effects were brought in the past by the brig *Consuelo*, and during the present year by the Anglo-American schooner *E. L Frost*.

Seventh: I also declare that my wealth is marital property, thus half corresponding to my wife. I hereby revoke all previous Wills and Codicils [LCM 53:5a] that may have been executed in writing or orally of any value, except this Last Will and Testament that I want to be deemed as such, and be observed in all its context as my Last Will. I sign it in this city of Agaña on the twentieth day of April of the year 1856. Francisco Tudela.

Attesting to this proceeding and signed by the infra written notary Cecilio Camacho, José Pérez.

In continuation, the aforesaid *Don* Cecilio Camacho arranged the documents to include the original testament and its following sheets in order to form a file and thus it was verified. To attest, it is signed by Cecilio Camacho, José Pérez.

[Note: On May 30, 1856, Doña Josefa Anderson was a widow at the age of 27 years, and by testamentary disposition got the guardianship and conservatorship of her three children with the condition not to remarry under penalty of been removed of such responsibility. The civil law of the time, Ley the Enjuiciamiento Civil,1855, indicated that minor children were emancipated at the age of twenty-five years, for a son, and twenty for a daughter or sooner if the son or daughter married before reaching legal age. This testamentary disposition limited Doña Josefa Anderson from remarrying until she would be about fifty years old].

Verification: The Senior Assistant of the *Compañía de Dotación* of these Islands, *Don* Cecilio Camacho, called for verification of the testament [LCM 53:7a]. To determine if the testament that precedes and appears signed by the deceased *Don* Francisco Tudela is his penmanship and the signature that appears is authentic. In order to accomplish this objective, the documents were presented to the present notary and *Don* Joaquín de León Guerrero, former guard of the Store of the Public Treasury and *Don* José Herrero, Lieutenant of the Company of Urban Militia in these Islands. They both swore to tell the truth; they were interrogated; and having been asked, *Don* Joaquín León Guerrero if knew the penmanship and signature that in life *Don* Francisco Tudela was accustomed to do, he said: that he knows them, because he have seen his hand-writing and signature several times; and having shown him the Testament [LCM 53:7b] that precedes, signed by the above-mentioned deceased and asked of whom was the hand-writing and signature that appears in the document? He answered that the hand-writing and signature were of the aforesaid deceased *Don* Francisco Tudela, and it is the same that he had seen him use always and that he knew them very well. Having asked the same questions of *Don* José Herrero separately, and whether he had witnessed the recognition of the other witness, he said likewise that the penmanship and signature that was presented to him, were of the same deceased *Don* Francisco Tudela, that he knew them because he had seen them different times in some documents. Everything that they affirmed and ratified was under oath of honor. *Don* Joaquín de León Guerrero declared to be fifty-six-years-old and *Don* José Herrero [LCM 53:8a] thirty-two years old, and so they signed with the said present notary, to which I attest. Cecilio Camacho, Joaquín de León Guerrero, José Herrero, José Pérez.

Immediately, the Senior Assistant of the *Compañía de Dotación* of these Islands, *Don* Cecilio Camacho in the same place with the Reverend Priest and witnesses that are mentioned in the previous proceeding, he ordered to continue with the inventory of all the goods and effects that were found in the house, for which *Doña* Josefa Anderson, spouse of the deceased *Don* Francisco Tudela, was notified, she was asked to show all the goods that belonged to the aforesaid deceased husband, and in compliance, she indicated what belonged to the above-mentioned deceased and, once things and effects were in view, the inventory started in the following form: On 9 June 1856 *Don* Cecilio Camacho, Senior Assistant of the *Compañía de Dotación* of these Islands summoned the experts on the island to establish the just price of the effects in the inventory. They were to be convened in the house of the deceased *Don* Francisco Tudela as follows: two *maestros plateros*, (master silversmiths) *Don*

Tiburcio Arriola and Mariano Arriola; two *maestros sastres*, (master tailors) *Don* José Herrero and Nicolas Sablan; two *maestros carpinteros*, (master carpenters) *Don* Justo de la Cruz and Manuel Tenorio; two *maestros herreros*, (master blacksmith) José de León Guerrero and Vicente Lujan. All goods and effects were put to disposition of the *maestros*, (experts) by *Doña* Josefa Anderson, the widow of *Don* Francisco Tudela.

The value established was in Currency: 1,542, *pesos oro*, gold and 1 *real*; 987 *pesos* in silver and various currencies, among them 784 Spanish, 25 Portuguese, 22 Dutch, 160 French. Total cash 3,321.40

The inventory of *Don* Francisco Tudela and *Doña* Josefa Anderson's belongings contained jewelry, clothes, furniture, animals, kitchen equipment, commercial effects, documents, damaged merchandise. For merchandise sold in auctions at the port, the valuation of these effects was 20,137 *pesos oro*, 4 *reales* and 19 *maravedies*.

Decree: Hereby, the undersigned summons *Doña* Josefa Anderson, widow of *Don* Francisco Tudela so she can argue her rights This was ordered by the Civil and Military Governor of these islands on 13 June 1856. Attested by Jose de la Cruz, José Pérez.

Notification of the previous decree was given to *Doña* Josefa Tuedela and she appeared before the Governor, expressing her rights in the following written testimony:

> I, *Doña* Josefa Anderson, widow of the *Subteniente Don* Francisco Tudela, appear before you and say that, in having seen the proceedings of the state of my late husband and declaring my right to half of the property left by his passing as marital property that was made in our marriage, and I was appointed guardian and curator of our youngest children José, Ana and María, and the goods consisting of clothing, furniture, and effects of my personal use and the remainder in money and articles of commerce, whose only means to preserve and increase the capital, is to sell the commercial effects and [LCM 53:22a] use the earnings to buy others of the same species, as they has been acquired, therefore, I have no interest or reason to partition them, I rather wish to continue doing business with the capital thus joined. Whereas, I ask and beg you to declare valid and legitimate as it is the Will quoted, recognizing me as the legal guardian and curator of my aforementioned children, appointing myself to continue on behalf of my children with the business of trade with the

initial capital, buying and selling at fair price. I oblige myself to keep the trade books required under the law and present them with the balance by the end of each year to be approved by the court as appropriate. I ask for justice and swear, signed in Agaña, on 16 June 1856. Not knowing how to write her name, Josefa Anderson, drew a cross next to her name.

Decree: As requested, it is recognized as legitimate and valid the original Will and Testament, which appears on page five of these proceedings, written and signed by *Don* Francisco Tudela, the approved inventory of his property found on pages [LCM 53:22b] seven to thirteen and also its valuation on pages 15 to 20. It is declared that the portion of the goods and effects corresponding to the widow *Doña* Josefa Anderson: ten thousand, one hundred sixty-eight *pesos oro*, two *reales*, with nine *maravedies* (10,168.29), which is half of the twenty thousand one hundred thirty-seven *pesos oro*, two *reales* and nine *maravedies* (20,137.29) that appear in the appraisal, in addition to one hundred and eighty-two *pesos oro* and four *reales* (182.40), which is the value of the timber on folio fourteen, thus corresponding to his three minor children in equal parts, another equal sum of ten thousand six hundred eighty-five *pesos oro*, nine *maravedies* (10,685.09).

Hereby, it is granted to Josefa Anderson the office of guardian and curator of their minor children *Don* José, *Doña* Ana and *Doña* María Tudela. Decree signed by the Judge in Agana, on 16 June 1856, to which we bear witness. Follows rubrics De la Corte, José de la Cruz. José Pérez.

[Note: With this Decree, Governor de la Corte granted the honorific title to the Tudela children, their legal name from the date issued were Don José Tudela, Doña Ana Tudela, and Doña María Tudela].

Decree: This Court issued a copy of the previous judgment to *Doña* Josefa Anderson widow of *Don* Francisco Tudela, and issued three copies of these proceedings, charging the cost to His Excellency Governor and Captain General of the Philippines. It is signed in Agaña on 1 July 1856 by José de la Cruz, José Pérez. [Note: The probate of *Don* Francisco Tudela conducted by the Judge of First Instance of the Mariana Islands was sent to the Superior Court in the Captaincy General of the Philippines to be revised and endorsed].

Decree from the Captaincy General, Court of War:
His Excellency: The Prosecutor has reviewed the proceedings of *Don* Francisco Tudela's probate, [LCM 53:31b] proceedings practiced in the Military and Political Government of the Marianas. It is to notice the following errors:

First, as observed in the actions taken by the government of these islands as a court delegate of this Captaincy General, Court of War, is that the proceedings have been extended on plain paper. Perhaps this is because in those islands they do not have competent paper or paper with the official seal, but in this case they should state the need to repay that obligation.

Second, the Prosecutor has noticed that the governor of the Marianas has exceeded its powers, since the declaration of value of the goods and effects of Tudela's Will, the approval of inventory, the partition of the inheritance, and the assignment of tutor and curator of their children is to be decided in the jurisdiction of the Court of the Captaincy General. This administration is clear that some inconvenience may be remedied and others may not, since they are finished, *Res Judicata*.

The third fault found is that the widow, *Doña* Josefa Anderson, was appointed tutor and curator without asking her for the deposit and renunciation prescribed in the law [LCM 53:32a]-labeled, title sixteen, *partida* sixth.

The fourth fault, the Court in the Marianas ruled that a bond is not required to exercise the office of curator, and such bond, the courts have deemed necessary. There has not been exception from it as stated in the provisions of the law ninth, same title, and section eighth in the annotation of Gregorio López. The judge in the Marianas has proceeded to conduct the partition of the inheritance, giving all of it to the widow, having only in his view the estate appraisal. The widow, being interested in half the estate, the judge should have appointed a counsel to represent the minors and open the corresponding proceedings for partition of the inheritance. = If the first two extremes mentioned above can be overcome, not the third, keeping in consideration that the commercial effects, which constitute the main part of the inheritance could be retailed. The Prosecutor, nevertheless, believes that it is required [LCM 53:32b] to admit the partition as has been practiced, both by the reason given, but because having the late Tudela said in his will that his wealth was in the amount of fourteen thousand *pesos* (14,000.00), the hereditary inventory has been reaching the sum of twenty thousand one hundred thirty-seven *pesos*, four *reales*, nineteen *maravedies*, it be assumed that the valuation indicated on folios 16 to 20 is secure and is not harmful to the minors. =

In consideration of the distance of the Mariana Islands and the difficulty of communicating with them, the Prosecutor also believes that with respect to the other drawbacks noted, it could be understandable, overlooking the assessment

done by the Governor of the Marianas in these proceedings, it is mandated, without prejudice, that the widow *Doña* Josefa Anderson must place a bond and comply with the law nine, same title, and section eight, article sixteen, of the *Partida* sixth. Registration of *Don* Francisco Tudela's Will and Testament must be done in the Office of the Senior Clerk of this Court. This is [LCM 53:33a] the opinion of the undersigned. If the Court finds that under the law, it could also make appropriate provisions to the governor of the Marianas to hereinafter apply the current provisions, which as a lawyer should not ignore and do not forget to rejoin the role of these provisions. Signed [in Manila] on 21 January 1857.

The Prosecutor in his previous testimony and opinion referred these proceedings to the Military Governor of the Marianas for the exact fulfillment of his opinion, and with this in mind, to apply the correct provisions of the law, revising the content and giving final sentence implementing it with the greatest possible brevity. It is necessary to regulate the cost of the proceedings by the public adjuster and pay the value of the paper and payment of the duties that shall be made to the Real Hacienda. Also, enclosed is a copy of the regulation. The actuary must register the Will as it is, unless a cause for annulment and damages from third parties is found [LCM 53:33b]. So it was ordered and signed by the Hon. Acting Captain General of these islands. As well as by the Judge Advocate, that I swear, signed Montero, Francisco Mariano Molina.

Decree: It is in conformity with the approval of the Prosecutor and judgment to charge $ 284.29 *pesos* to the estate of the *Subteniente* of the Infantry *Don* Francisco Tudela, who was retired in the Mariana Islands. In compliance with the mandate in that order, the undersigned gets this testimony in Manila from the Senior Clerk of the Court of War on January 29 of 1857. Signatures of Luciano Molina, Mauricio Silvestre, and witnessing Mariano Molina.

Decree: The previous court order issued by the Hon. Captain General of the Philippines must be obeyed and complied with in all its parts. *Doña* Josefa Anderson, widow of *Don* Francisco Tudela, must make the payment of fifty-one *pesos*, four *reales* (51.40), corresponding to taxes and costs of the accompanying proceedings and she must pay the bond referred to which corresponds to ten thousand and sixty-eight *pesos oro*, six *reales* and nine *maravedies* (10,068.69), which is the part that[LCM 53:34a] corresponds to the inheritance of their children *Don* José, *Doña* Ana and *Doña* María Tudela; then she must comply with what is prescribed in the above court order. This is ordered and signed by the Civil and

Military Governor of these Islands, in Agana, 27 September 1859. La Corte. Witnesses: José Herrero and Ignacio Aguon.

On the same day, month and year, we went to the house of *Doña* Josefa Anderson and we informed her of the previous decree. She received a copy of that order and paid immediately the amount of fifty-one *pesos* and four *reales* (51.40) and drew a cross next to her name, because she does not know how to write, + Josefa Anderson, which we witnessed, José Herrero, Ignacio Aguon.

The amount of fifty-one *pesos* and four *reales* (51.40) was distributed as follows: ($38.37) to be paid to the *Real Hacienda* as payment to the Captain General of the Philippines, and ($13.03) was paid to the following individuals, judicial aids in the Mariana Islands: José Herrero, Ignacio Aguon, De la Corte, Judge, Luis Camacho, and José Pérez.

Memorandum to the Governor Don Felipe de la Corte:
I, Josefa Anderson, widow of the retired *Sergento Mayor Don* Francisco Tudela, before you, to the best of my knowledge of the law, I say that, on this date, I have been notified of the order from the court, which demands that I pay a bond as guardian and curator of the property of my minor children, *Don* José, *Doña* Ana and *Doña* María Tudela and found myself obligated to pay such amount to the capital, Manila [LCM 53:35a]. Since here in the Marianas there are not wealthy people, nor are them possessing large farms that exceed the value to secure the sum of ten thousand and sixty-eight *pesos oro*, six *reales* and nine and a half *maravedies* ($10,068.69½) which is the value of the inheritance of my children. To your excellency, I ask and implore you to admit the requested financial guarantee or security deposit in cash, in the amount of ten thousand and sixty-eight *pesos*, six *reales* nine and a half *maravedies* (10,068.69½), which has to be transferred to the General Treasury in Manila, where this money must remain on deposit at the disposal of the Captaincy General's Court, to which I shall agree what is meant to be under the right of my children that I represent. It is grace and hope that you administer justice. Agaña, 27 September 1859. She drew a cross before her name, not knowing how to write + Josefa Anderson.

Decree: As requested, accept the security deposit offered to be deposited in the General Fund of the Treasury of the Philippines and demand from *Doña* Josefa Anderson the receipt or certificate to be attached to these proceedings. So the

Governor commanded and initialed it in Agaña, on 27 September 1859 [LCM 53:35b]. Following two rubrics. José Herrero and -Ignacio Aguon.

Decree: Included in these proceedings is the receipt from *Doña* Josefa Anderson, which is proof that she has paid into the Fund of the Treasury of these islands the amount of ten thousand and sixty-eight *pesos*, seventy-seven *reales* and three eighths ($10,068.77⅜) to be deposited and held in trust by the Treasury General of Manila, to be available to the Court of the Captaincy General. Issue a testimony of all proceedings and one copy is to be kept in the file of this Government with the original file. This is what the Governor commanded and signed Judge in Agaña on 28 September 1859 to which we bear witness. -Following rubrics, -de la Corte, -José Herrero, -Ignacio Aguon.

Hereby, we certify that we have attached the receipt from *Doña* Josefa Anderson in the following folio [LCM 52:36a]. We bear witness. José Herrero, Ignacio Aguon.

Receipt: *Don* Felix Calvo, Administrator of the Treasury of the Mariana Islands, certify that *Doña* Josefa Anderson has deposited in the National Treasury of these islands the amount of ten thousand and sixty-eight *pesos oro* and seventy seven *reales* and three eighths ($10,068.77⅜) in gold from the South American republics for the purpose of being deposited into the General Treasury of the Philippines, keeping them in trust and available to the Court of War of His Excellence the Captain General of the Philippines and for the record, I issued this receipt in quadruplicate, signed and sealed, endorsed by the Governor of these islands in Agaña on 27 September1859. Felix Calvo and endorsed by De la Corte.

Certification: On the twenty-eighth of this month and year, the undersigned have recorded testimony taken of the proceedings, as it was ordered. Sending copies to the Superior Government of the provisions contained in seven pages [LCM 53:36b] that consist of pages twenty-eight to page thirty-five of the original testimony is kept in the files of this government. This is an official negotiation, to which we bear witness, signed. José Herrero, Ignacio Aguon (LCM 53:37a).

Certification: *Don* Felix Calvo, Administrator of the Treasury of these Mariana Islands, certifies that through the Court of War of this government has deposited in the National Treasury of these islands the amount of thirty-eight *pesos* and thirty-seven and one half *reales* ($ 38.37 ½) to be delivered by the General Treasury to the order of the Honorable Court of War of the Captain General of the Philippines and for the record, I issued it in quadruplicate, signed and sealed, endorsed by the

Governor of these islands, in Agaña, on 27 September 1859. Felix Calvo and endorsed by De la Corte. End of the proceedings of *Don* Francisco Tudela's probate (LCM Manuscripts, Item 53).

Doña Josefa Anderson met all legal requirements demanded by the Court of War in the Captaincy General of the Philippines. She placed the inheritance of her children in trust in that Court. The testamentary proceedings were carried out according to the *Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil* of 1855, Articles 414 - 535.

Business Activities of Doña Josefa widow of Don Francisco Tudela
With her inheritance, *Doña* Josefa Anderson became an entrepreneur. She was the richest person in the Mariana Islands. During the tenure of Governor *Don* Felipe de la Corte (1855-1866), when the economy of the Marianas was flourishing, thanks to the whalers that arrived at the port and sold their merchandise and local farmers sold their produce, it was a period encouraging economic activity. Governor de la Corte encouraged agriculture in order to develop the economy. The economic activity was significant enough that several residents of Agaña relocated to the village of Sumay near to the port of San Luis de Apra.

In the judicial records from the Spanish administration one can find several transactions made by *Doña* Josefa Anderson. These records show evidence of her entrepreneurial activity in the island upon the death of her husband. She was active in the real estate business. On 22 November 1856 she purchased the house of *Doña* Rita Tonson in the Barrio of San Ramón in Agaña (Judicial Records, Caja 13, No. 34). Also, on 20 august 1867 *Doña* Josefa Anderson purchased the house of *Doña* Rita Acosta y de León in Asan for two hundred twenty pesos ($220), and a year later, on 31 October 1868, *Doña* Josefa Anderson sold the land to *Don* Vicente Guilló for eight hundred pesos ($800) (Judicial Records, Caja 14, No. 50).

Governor de la Corte wrote a report to the Superior Government recommending an immigration program to allow Chinese workers to establish themselves as workers on Guam (PNA 18, Exp. 15, fols. 1-28b). In 1857, following the report, the commission was in favor, and *Don* Felipe de la Corte requested authorization to import Chinese in order to promote their work in agriculture. The Secretariat of the Administration and Finance of the Philippines issued a statement of conditions under Article 3 of the statement approved by His Majesty in Royal Decree of 25 August 1858, which authorized the contract for public services. The Superior Government of the Philippines sent thirty-nine Chinese who have not paid their

capitaciones [the taxes imposed per capita] in that capital of Manila (Ibáñez y García, 1992:176). Upon their arrival in the Marianas, the Chinese workers had to find a local person with a good financial background to sponsor them. The sponsors have to place a bond with the Royal Treasury on behalf of the worker they sponsored. In the meantime, the Chinese worker was obligated to work for the sponsor until the obligation was fulfilled; once the obligation was paid, the Chinese were free to pursue any enterprise in the Marianas.

On 9 July 1858 *Doña* Josefa Anderson, widow of the late Don Francisco Tudela appeared, before the Treasurer in Agaña with the Chinese Sy Taco No. 18, and said, *Doña* Josefa obligated herself to satisfy the debt that the Chinese owed to the Royal Treasury on the terms of the circular from this government. She was aware that the Chinese must receive a salary of three *pesos* monthly, in addition to food and clothing that will be needed, and including the payment of twelve *reales* for training and two *reales* for communal work that he must meet annually. The Chinese for his part obligated himself to work in the service of *Doña* Josefa Anderson during the time it takes to pay off the debt or for a term of three years. It was signed by all the mentioned and the Chinese interpreter Cang Ajo, witnessing *Don* José Pérez and *Don* José Martínez, the Secretary of this Government, also Ygnacio Aguon witness. Signatures: At the request, *Doña* Josefa Anderson drew a cross, Andres de Castro, Sy Taco, a symbol [Chinese], José Herrero, and Ygnacio Aguon, [34b].

There is a marginal note which says: "The debt was paid to the Royal Treasury by the Chinese Sy Taco No. 18, on 14 January 1860" (Judicial Records, Caja 13, No. 82:1858).

Doña Josefa Anderson's businesses also included financial activities. Since private loans were required to be registered with the Office of the Civil and Military Governor of the Marianas, evidence of such activities was recorded. On 22 July 1857, *Doña* Josefa Anderson registered a loan in favor of *Don* Felix Calvo for the purpose of buying a boat in Manila. The loan was originated on 20 June 1856 for the amount of one thousand *pesos* ($1,000). On 22 February 1860 the loan was paid, and *Don* Andrés de Castro, representing *Doña* Josefa Anderson, testified receiving such payment (Judicial Records, Caja 13, No. 57:1857).

The Irishman, George Henry Johnston "acquired his fortune over many years. It was based on gathering *balate,* the preparation of salted meat, and other commercial items" (Ibáñez y García, 1992:113-114). In addition, in the year 1866, he

received a monetary reward for the salvage of the barque *Libelle*, which was wrecked at Wake Island (Drechsler, 2007:169; Ibáñez, 1998:33). Having his capital, Mr. G.H. Johnston and *Doña* Josefa Anderson, whose capital was from her inheritance, formed a commercial society on 3 July 1866. The capital of this society was eighteen thousand *pesos* ($18,000), of which each partner had invested nine thousand *pesos*. The purpose of the commercial society was to purchase a ship with a Spanish flag to conduct business within the Mariana Islands and abroad. The ship's activities also included the exploitation of the islands of Agrigan and Pagan, that Mr. Johnston had on lease. The dividends were to be distributed annually and the terms of duration of this society was five years, extended upon agreement of the partners (Judicial Records, Caja 12, No. 152:1866).

The commercial society did not yield profits during the first two years. Disappointed with the financial reports, *Doña* Josefa Anderson requested liquidation of the society, presenting a petition before the Judge of First Instance and Governor *Don* Francisco Moscoso y Lara on 15 November 1868. The society was liquidated and each of the partners received four thousand one-hundred twenty-five *pesos* ($4,125). *Doña* Josefa Anderson lost 58.16% of her capital, as did her partner George H Johnston, the lessee of the islands of Agrigan and Pagan. The loss of capital made him unable to exploit the islands' resources, and he was in default of the contract (Judicial Records, Caja 14, No.53:1868).

The Superior Government in Manila charged him with failure to comply with the contract for the lease of the islands, also charging Governor Moscoso and *Don* Froilan Blanco, the Administrator of the Public Treasury of the Marianas for not reporting the lack of payments for three years. The Superior government argued that it was a falsification in the lease document, but when the General Headquarters of the Treasury in the Philippines received the payment from Mr. Johnston's bondsman, *Don* Vicente Calvo, it was determined that "the requests regarding the subject have been completely satisfied" (Driver and Brunal-Perry 1996:83-92).

Carlos Madrid reported that Governor Moscoso was the partner of George Johnston in this commercial society (Madrid, 2006:31). That claim is not supported by this documentation or by the report of Moscoso's successor Governor *Don* Luís de Ibáñez y García (Ibáñez y García, 1992:114).

In the year 1867, *Don* José Tudela Anderson was about seventeen years old. He was the eldest son of the late *Don* Francisco Tudela and *Doña* Josefa Anderson. He married *Doña* Francisca de Cepeda Ramírez. Their first child was born in 1868 and was named Francisco Tudela y Ramírez (Rodgers, 2000:23).

The *Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil* 1855 (Law of Civil Procedure 1855), in its title IX, indicated the legitimate child that is married became of legal age to represent him/her in the Court of War in the Captaincy General of the Philippines. After the marriage of *Don* José Tudela Anderson, his mother, the tutor and curator, *Doña* Josefa Anderson, sent a power of attorney to *Don* Victor Alcalde y Tovajas, in Manila, to represent her in the court in Manila in order to collect ten thousand one-hundred sixty two *pesos* and twenty-six *reales* ($10,162.26), which was the inheritance of her children *Don* José, *Doña* Ana and *Doña* Maria Tudela Anderson. It was signed in Agaña on 23 November 1867. The commission of her attorney was unsuccessful in collecting that money (Judicial Records, Caja 14, No 23:1867).

A year later, Doña Josefa Anderson issued a second power of attorney to *Don* José Garrido y Muñoz for the purpose of collecting ten thousand one-hundred sixty two *pesos* and twenty-six *reales* ($10,162.26), which was the inheritance of her children, money that was in trust at the Court of War in the Captaincy General of the Philippines. This was signed in Agaña on 5 October 1868 (Judicial Records, Caja 14, No 49:1868). There is no evidence that this commission was successful.

After the marriage of *Don* José Tudela Anderson in 1867, he was emancipated, and *Doña* Josefa Anderson continued to be the tutor and curator of her two daughters, *Doña* Ana (1851?) and *Doña* María Tudela Anderson (1853). Doña María married Governor *Don* Francisco Moscoso in the Church of Agaña in 1870, and they departed for Manila on 7 September 1871, Doña Ana went with them. The following is the translation of the documents in the file concerning his matrimony.

Archivo General Militar, Segovia, AGMS, M-4651
Nuptial File 1870
Don Francisco Moscoso y Lara
Graduated Lieutenant Colonel

On September 30, 1870, Lt. Colonel *Don* Francisco Moscoso y Lara, in San Ignacio de Agaña, requested license to marry *Doña* María Tudela Anderson. There is a certification dated 26 September 1870 from Fr. Aniceto Ibáñez del Carmen, Vicar

Forane and Provincial of the Mariana Islands, Ecclesiastical Judge, and Parish Priest of the city of Agaña, and Chaplain of the Presidio, which certifies that *Don* Francisco Moscoso y Lara is the widower of *Doña* Concha Losada, who died and received the last rites in Valladolid, Spain on 22 April 1869 at age 40. She was born in Alicante and baptized in the Collegiate Church of St. Nicholas, daughter of Captain Julián María de Losada from Ceuta, and her mother from Jerez. She issued a testament and left four children, José, María, Francisco, and Fernando. *Don* Francisco Moscoso y Lara and *Doña* Concha Losada were married in July 1847.

Don Francisco Moscoso was baptized on 10 February 1825, in the parish church of San Pedro, in Antequera. He was born on 9 February 1825, legitimate son of *Don* José Moscoso y Coca, Captain of the Infantry (he retired with the rank of Colonel) and *Doña* Rita Lara y Pineda, both residents of Antequera (AGMS, M-4651, Matrimonial File, Francisco Moscoso and Lara). Antequera is a city and municipality in the province of Málaga, part of the Spanish autonomous community of Andalusia. It is known as "the heart of Andalusia".

Fr. Aniceto Ibáñez also certifies that *Doña* María Tudela Anderson is the legitimate daughter of *Don* Francisco Tudela, European-born Spaniard and *Doña* Josefa Anderson, a native-born Spaniard of the Marianas, residing in Agaña. She is single, of good behavior and good morality, *Doña* María was born on 12 April 1853, and baptized by the Parish Priest Fray Vicente Acosta de la Santísima Trinidad, on 13 April of that year. Her godmother was María Anderson, all residents of Agaña. This is in accordance with its original in the book of baptisms of the archives of this parish of 22 March 1843 to 29 November 1854 (AGMS, M-4651).

Don Francisco Moscoso y Lara
Graduated Colonel
Service Record
Archivo General Militar, Segovia, AGMS, 504. No. 27784

Governor *Don* Francisco Moscoso y Lara (1825 - ?). At the close of his file in March 1876, the notes contained are: accredited value, application and capacity and timeliness of many services, good conduct and health, married, 1.50 meters, (4.92 ft.) height, outstanding in tactics and ordinance, attention to details, skilled in accounting, and great instruction and military methods.

Don Francisco Moscoso y Lara, Civil and Military Governor of the Mariana Islands (1866-1871). While stationed in Manila by Royal Order of 29 July 1865, he was appointed governor of the Mariana Islands, departing Manila on 16 December of that year, on board of His Majesty's corvette *Narvaez*, arriving on Guam on 21 January 1866. He took possession and assumed office on 28 January 1866. During his tenure as Governor, he was promoted to the rank of Lt. Colonel on June 23, 1867. In 1868, a year later, Lt. Colonel Moscoso y Lara was promoted to the rank of Colonel, by Decree of Grace from the Ministry of War. On 28 September 1869, he swore alliance to the Constitution that was proclaimed by the Constitutional Courts, until 18 August 1871 that he was sworn in fidelity and obedience to King Amadeo I. He was relieved by Colonel Luís Ibáñez y García, as provided by Decree of 19 June 1871, and returned to Manila, assigned Colonel of the King's Regiment in the garrison of Manila, until 21 January 1872, when he and his battalion went to Cavite.

Insurrection in Cavite:
Colonel Moscoso y Lara was the commander of the Third Civil Guard and the Battalion of Visayas (1872-1876). On 21 January 1872, in Cavite, he passes and bypasses the fortress of San Felipe and with his troops assaulted the ramparts of the fort, restored order, and killed or captured the rebels. In 1873, he had a temporary sick leave for two months (March to May). Once he recovered his health, in May 1873, he went to Dangay until 20 April 1874. He was appointed Inspector General of Prisons in Manila until March 1875. On 30 March 1876, he retired with 39 years, one month, and 22 days of service, in addition to three years, seven months of bonus by Royal Decree of 20 October 1835, for a total of 42 years, 8 months, and 22 days (AGMS, 504:1).

While Colonel *Don* Francisco Moscoso y Lara was serving as commander of the Third Civil Guard and the Battalion of Visayas with the mission of restoring order in Cavite, a *Juicio de Residencia* against him was beginning in the Marianas. The revolutionaries and political prisoners, his enemies from Cavite, were sent to the Mariana Islands, where most of them were living among the general population.

What is a *Juicio de Residencia?* It is an investigative inquiry that had the formal structure of the inquisitive criminal procedure, which placed the defendant in a clear and definite disadvantage. The fact that the preliminary investigation of the crime is conducted by the same judge called the *Juez de Residencia*, or *Pequisidor*.

He conducts the proceedings until the time he considers that he has acquired sufficient evidence to issue a sentence, which always results in a conviction. The procedural features are a severe detriment to the accused, since the witnesses are favored by the system of informers, the use of witnesses' depositions and acceptance of evidence of low probative value was used to impose harsh penalties. The defendant was not represented during the trial.

Complaints against Governor Moscoso were received at the Superior Tribunal of the *Audiencia* in Manila, which originated the order for a *Juicio de Residencia*, which was initiated as a *Juicio Ordinario de Residencia* (AHN, Ultramar 2229, Exp. 59, folio No. 2.945.929ss). The implication of *Ordinario* is that the trial only began upon the end of the governor's tenure.

In Agaña, adversaries of Governor Moscoso were enthusiastically expecting a *Juez the Residencia* to initiate the proceedings. Fr. Aniceto Ibáñez, reported that "on 14 August 1871, the mail ship *María Rosario* anchored in Apra Harbor with Señor Coronel Don Luis Ibáñez governor-designated of these islands. Also aboard was Juan Alvarez Guerra, *alcalde* de Cavite, in charge of Binondo, and the *juez de residencia* for the administration of *Don* Francisco Moscoso y Lara" (Ibáñez, 1998:46). The information about Juan Alvarez Guerra coming to the Marianas as the *juez de residencia* was an incorrect assumption of Fr. Aniceto Ibáñez, as was his report, saying that the investigation began on the eighteenth. Also, Carlos Madrid repeated the same error reporting that "the Court of Inquiry lasted only a week, and while the ex-governor was still on the island, it was more than likely that few persons came forward to give their complete testimony against him" (Madrid, 2006:47). A report by *Don* Juan Alvarez Guerra dated in Manila 1872, indicates that he came to the Marianas commissioned by the Captain and Governor General of the Philippines, *Don* Rafael Izquierdo for the specific purpose to conduct a comprehensive study about the material, moral, and political conditions of the Mariana Islands. According to his report, his investigation was in fulfillment of the orders received by the decree of 4 July 1871 (Alvarez Guerra, 1872:1). Alvarez Guerra also published a book *Un viaje por Oriente: De Manila a Marianas* in 1887, which contains nothing about a *Juicio de Residencia*.

Three years later, in the *Chronicle of the Mariana Islands*, Fr. Aniceto Ibáñez reported: "On 5 August 1874, the merchant steamer *Panay* anchored at the port of San Luis de Apra. Aboard were [among others] the *alcalde*, *Don* Gregorio M. Cepeda, and two notaries public, qualified to continue the investigation of events

that took place during the *Residencia* of Governor *Don* Francisco Moscoso y Lara" (Ibáñez, 1998:60-61). *Don* Gregorio Martínez Cepeda, the *Juez de Residencia* with his two notaries initiated the investigation of the accusations that were received by the *Audiencia* en Manila against former Governor Moscoso (AHN, Ultramar 2229, Exp. 59).

Chapter one of *Beyond Distances*, is devoted to highlighting the accusations against Governor Moscoso, however, the author indicates that his version uses one document which is not cited. The author cites "AHN Legajo 2229, Exp. 3 *Sentencia contra el Coronel Francisco Moscoso,"* This is an incomplete citation, and the title also is incorrect. Madrid indicates that "full trial, including the testimonies of the witnesses, would provide fuller and more detailed information on the matter that may differ, in part, from that of the sentence itself" (Madrid 2006:48 #3). It is important to indicate the error in the source because most of those accusations presented by Madrid, 2006:29-47, were found to be false by the Judge and were dismissed.

The verdict and its considerations are found in AHN, Ultramar 2229, Exp. 59 *Juicio de Residencia de Don Francisco Moscoso y Lara G.P.M. que fue de las Islas Marianas. Solicita indulto*. The content of the document AHN, Ultramar 2229, Exp. 59 is *res judicata* [Latin, a thing adjudged]. That is a final judgment on the merits by a court having jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties to a suit as to all matters that were litigated or that could have been litigated in that suit. The account or "version" presented in chapter one in *Beyond Distances* seems to be an interpretation based on the allegations only. Governor Moscoso was indicted by the Judge of *Residencia* and his harsh sentence was modified by the *Audiencia* of Manila on 4 February 1876, to fit the charges with the legislation of the time (AHN, Ultramar 2229, Exp. 59: 2.945.903b). The full text of the sentence is the subject of other work in progress, this separate study is necessary to understand the whole process that separates the criminalization of the actions of the Governor from the false allegations, which the witnesses were not able to corroborate, nor was anyone able to present evidence before the Judge of *Residencia*.

This paper concerns the history of the Tudela's family, Governor Moscoso is included since he became part of this family by marriage. In 1874, before coming to the Marianas, the Judge, *Don* Gregorio Martínez de Cepeda interrogated the former Governor Moscoso in Manila. Under oath, he declared that he was married to *Doña* María Tudela Anderson from the of city of Agaña with whom he has two children, and five children from his first marriage with Doña Concepción Lozada (AHN,

Ultramar 2229, Exp. 59, No. 2.945.947b; AGMS, M-4651, Nuptial File of Francisco Moscoso y Lara).

There were rumors regarding Governor Moscoso and *Doña* Josefa Anderson having an affair and a child during his tenure as Governor of the Marianas, the Judge *Don* Gregorio Martínez de Cepeda investigated that allegation. With the zeal of the inquisitive judge, he interviewed *Doña* Josefa Anderson and other people in Agaña, and reported "no one has affirmed what one said, and it was not possible to get evidence to support the claim regarding carriage rides, illicit relationship, and the birth of a child of the former Governor attributed to *Doña* Josefa Anderson, who could not be the woman that was implied in the letters and not recognized [anonymous] in the proceedings (AHN, Ultramar 2229, Exp. 59: No. 2.945.945).

People with ill will, tried to blemish her reputation to diminish her strong will to succeed; *Doña* Josefa Anderson was vindicated by the Judge of *Residencia's* veredict given in the city of Agaña, the capital of the Mariana Islands, on 5 December 1874, where she continued living.

On 5 March 1880, *Doña* Josefa Anderson issued a power of attorney to her son-in-law *Don* Francisco Moscoso to represent her in the matters concerning her daughter *Doña* Ana Tudela's marriage arrangements in the city of Valladolid, Spain, where they resided (*Judicial Records*, case 157). Carlos Madrid incorrectly cites this source *Judicial Records*, case 157, in regard to María Tudela having two children and returning with him to Spain (2006:31).

Conclusion

The documentation presented and discussed in this paper is for the purpose of giving an objective account of *Don* Francisco Tudela and *Doña* Josefa Anderson. She was a prominent businesswoman in the Marianas, and all her transactions were correct as it is shown in the documents found in the Agaña's archives. All her transactions were in compliance with legal and official requirements, and she was a dedicated mother as her late husband said in his Last Will and Testament, "her good behavior and the maternal love that she professes to them" [their children] (LCM, 53:4b). She also was in compliance with the wish of her late husband not to remarry until her children were of legal age, and she remained single. *Doña* Josefa Anderson overcame the limited education that women in the Marianas received. When she began to conduct her businesses, after 1856, she was unable to sign her name, because she did not know how to write, but she fought that limitation and a

few years later, she became literate and documents were signed by her. Her success should be studied with interest.

In 1897, *Doña* Josefa Anderson was 73 years old, a widow, and she was living with her second-born grandson José R. Tudela, 28 years old, single, as they were listed in the Spanish Census of 1897. They were living in the household of Vicente Aguon, in Agaña, Cabecería No. 10. Her first born grandson, Francisco R. Tudela, was married to Ana D. Sablan (LCM, 98 Padrón de almas, 1897:99-93b). No more documentation was found.

María Tudela Anderson was the only woman from the Mariana Islands that was married to a Spanish Governor in the church of Agaña. Some people were resentful, and upon the arrival of the United States Lt. Governor Edwin Safford in 1898-99, someone, wishing to please the new colonial power, told him about "Moscoso having an illegitimate child with a woman, by whom he had a daughter. He then married a daughter of the same woman, and took his wife and natural daughter (her half-sister) to Spain with him" (Safford, 1901:467). That was a rumor, which was found to be false in 1874 by the judge of *Residencia*.

Geraldine Tudela Asuncion Rodgers and Michael Dewey Rodgers, Jr. in their book *A Book of the Tudela Family Genealogy of the Marianas*, 2000, present a comprehensive registry of the descendants of *Don* Francisco Tudela and *Doña* Josefa Anderson, but the information on the sisters of *Don* José is missing, with the documentation presented in this paper that void can be rectified.

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